🚨 New Windows 0-Click NTLM Credential Leakage — Patch Bypass Alert Powered by CyberDudeBivash — India’s emerging cybersecurity hub

⚠️ Critical Update for All Windows Admins & Security Teams

A new 0-click NTLM credential leakage vulnerability has been discovered that bypasses Microsoft’s previous patch — putting Windows systems back in the attacker’s crosshairs.

🔍 What’s the Threat?

0-click = The victim doesn’t have to click anything. Merely viewing a crafted file (like an email, shared doc, or SMB resource) can trigger the exploit.
The flaw enables NTLM authentication requests to be coerced to an attacker-controlled server.
Once intercepted, NTLM hashes can be cracked offline or relayed to escalate privileges, pivot laterally, or access sensitive resources.
This new technique evades Microsoft’s previous mitigations for similar NTLM leak vulnerabilities.

🛠️ How It Works

Malicious resource reference (UNC path, embedded link, crafted LNK file) points to attacker’s SMB/WebDAV server.
Windows automatically attempts NTLM auth when resolving that path.
Attacker harvests the NTLMv2 hash.
Offline cracking or NTLM relay is used to impersonate the user or gain higher privileges.

🎯 Why It’s Dangerous

Works on fully patched Windows builds that applied Microsoft’s earlier NTLM leak fix.
No user interaction needed = stealthy exploitation.
Effective for internal breaches and red team operations.
Can be chained with Relay to Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) or other lateral movement techniques.

🛡️ CyberDudeBivash Countermeasures

1️⃣ Immediate Mitigations

Block outbound SMB (TCP 445) and WebDAV (TCP 80/443) to untrusted IP ranges.
Disable NTLM where possible: Group Policy → Security Options → “Network security: Restrict NTLM.”
For high-value accounts, enforce Kerberos-only auth.

2️⃣ Monitoring & Detection

SIEM/EDR alerts for:
- Outbound SMB connections to non-whitelisted destinations.
- NTLM authentication attempts to unfamiliar hosts.
Hunt for suspicious UNC paths in logs.

3️⃣ Hardening

Apply Microsoft’s latest advisories & registry-level mitigations for NTLM leak scenarios.
Disable WebClient service if not required.
Isolate high-privilege accounts on separate admin workstations (PAWs).

💬 Over to You

How many of you still see NTLM enabled in production? And do you have SMB egress filtering in place right now?

Let’s talk in the comments — this is a wake-up call for every Windows environment.

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