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This report distills how a modern “Interlock”-branded ransomware operation would typically breach, escalate, laterally move, exfiltrate, and encrypt—mapped to ATT&CK—with concrete detections and response steps. Use it to prepare, detect early, and contain fast. Where public IOCs are unclear or fluid, we focus on behaviors that hold across builds/versions.
1) Executive Snapshot
- Threat class: Human-operated, double-extortion ransomware (data theft → encryption → leak pressure).
- Targets: Windows-first enterprise networks; opportunistic to mid-market; cloud file shares if reachable.
- Initial access: Stolen VPN creds, insecure RDP, phishing leading to info-stealers, public-facing app exploits (n-day/KEV).
- Living-off-the-land: Uses Cobalt/Sliver/Net tools* or native admin utilities (PowerShell, WMI, PsExec, RDP).
- Impact: Mass encryption of on-prem file servers, user shares, and reachable backups; business interruption + data-extortion site.
What stops it: Zero-Trust for admin access, EDR/XDR stop-rules on encryption behaviors, tight AD/backup hygiene, immutable offsite backups, and rapid IR.
2) MITRE ATT&CK Mapping (behavioral)
| Phase | Techniques (examples) |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App, T1133 External Remote Services (VPN/RDP), T1566 Phishing |
| Execution | T1059 PowerShell / CMD; T1219 Remote Services; signed binaries (T1218) |
| Persistence | T1053 Scheduled Task; Run/RunOnce keys; service install (T1543) |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Priv-Esc; token manipulation; UAC bypass |
| Defense Evasion | T1562 Impair Defenses (EDR kill, tamper with AV/backup agents); T1070 Clear Logs |
| Credential Access | T1003 LSASS dump; NTDS.dit via ntdsutil/vssadmin; browser credential theft |
| Discovery | T1046 Network Scan; T1018 Remote System Discovery; AD and share enumeration |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 Remote Services (RDP/PsExec/WMI); SMB admin shares |
| Collection/Exfil | T1041 Exfil over C2/WebDAV; cloud storage clients; Rclone/MEGA/OneDrive CLI |
| Impact | T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; shadow copy deletion; backup sabotage; service stop |
Treat the above as a hunting checklist—each row becomes a detection use case.
3) Likely Kill-Chain (Step-by-Step)
Step 1 — Access brokerage / foothold
- Compromised credentials (phished or from info-stealer logs) are tested against VPN/RDP/SSO.
- Vulnerable edge service exploited (e.g., unpatched web/remote admin).
Defender task: block password reuse; enforce phishing-resistant MFA; keep all edge services in KEV-compliant patch state; geo/IP allowlists.
Step 2 — Post-exploitation staging
- Drop lightweight loader (native LOLBins or legit admin tools) → memory beacon to C2.
- Enumerate domain, high-value servers, backup infrastructure.
Defender task: detect unknown beacons; watch for enumeration commands, net scans, AD queries from unusual hosts.
Step 3 — Priv-Esc + lateral movement
- UAC bypass or stolen admin token; jump using RDP/PsExec/WMI; spread to file servers and DC-adjacent hosts.
Defender task: EDR block policy for PsExec and RDP lateral movement; detectpsexecsvccreation and admin$ copy bursts.
Step 4 — Exfiltration prep
- Stage archives; exfil via Rclone/SFTP/WebDAV/cloud CLI to attacker-controlled storage.
Defender task: monitor for new exes in%ProgramData%/%AppData%; egress allowlists; block cloud CLI tools on servers.
Step 5 — Impact
- Stop AV/backup services; delete shadow copies; push encryptor; run parallel encryption jobs across shares; drop ransom note.
Defender task: stop-rules for mass file-touch/entropy spikes; lockdown on unexpectedvssadmin delete shadows,wbadmin,bcdedit,wmic shadowcopyusage.
4) High-Fidelity Detections (drop-in)
A) Mass encryption behavior (EDR/XDR logic)
- Sudden >1,000 file writes/min with high entropy; many “rename to .<ext>” events; simultaneous activity across multiple shares.
- Tight rule: if process not in file-server allowlist AND touches >N files/minute with >M entropy → kill & isolate host.
B) Backup sabotage
index=windows EventCode IN (4688,1) CommandLine="*vssadmin*delete*shadows*" OR CommandLine="*wbadmin*delete*catalog*" OR CommandLine="*bcdedit*set*recoveryenabled*No*"
| stats count by host, user, parent_process, CommandLine
C) PsExec & lateral movement
index=windows (Image="*\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\psexesvc.exe") OR (CommandLine="*sc \\\\* create PSEXESVC*")
| stats count by dest, user, Image, CommandLine
D) Rclone / cloud exfil
index=windows Image="*\\rclone.exe" OR CommandLine="*rclone copy*" OR CommandLine="*rclone sync*"
| stats count by host, user, CommandLine
E) Shadow IT admin tools
index=windows (Image="*\\adfind.exe" OR Image="*\\bloodhound*") OR (CommandLine="*ldap*" AND CommandLine="*search*")
| stats count by host, user, Image, CommandLine
F) Suspicious service creation
index=windows EventCode=7045
| where like(ServiceName,"%psexesvc%") OR like(ImagePath,"%\\Users\\%") OR like(ImagePath,"%\\AppData\\%")
Convert to Sigma/Kusto as needed; tune with allowlists (backup servers will legitimately touch many files).
5) IR Playbook (first 48 hours)
Hour 0–2: Contain
- Isolate impacted hosts (EDR network containment).
- Disable compromised accounts & revoke tokens; rotate passwords of service & backup accounts.
- Block suspicious egress to newly observed IPs/domains.
Hour 2–8: Scope
- Pull process trees, service creations, scheduled tasks, and PowerShell transcripts.
- Hunt for exfil tools (Rclone/7zip/WinSCP) and staging dirs.
- Verify domain controllers integrity; inspect GPO for malicious startup scripts.
Hour 8–24: Eradicate
- Remove persistence (tasks, services, Run keys).
- Rebuild compromised servers from gold images; restore least privilege.
- Invalidate lateral movement paths (disable local admin re-use, reset KRBTGT if DC tampering suspected).
Hour 24–48: Recover
- Restore immutable backups after verifying no backdoor and no exfil foothold remains.
- Increase monitoring for 30 days (failed logons, new MFA devices, new OAuth consents, new scheduled tasks).
- Legal & comms: handle extortion note via incident response policy; involve counsel & law enforcement per jurisdiction.
6) Hardening That Works (repeatable wins)
- Identity: Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2), conditional access, disable legacy auth.
- Admin plane: Put RDP/SMB/Remote tools behind ZTNA/VPN; per-admin accounts; PAM for privileged elevation.
- EDR/XDR everywhere: Servers + workstations + DCs; tamper protection; block script interpreters launching from user profiles.
- Backups: 3-2-1 with immutable object-lock; routinely test restores; separate backup admin identity.
- AD Hygiene: Randomized local admin passwords (LAPS), tiered admin model, disable unused protocols, constrained delegation.
- Egress control: DNS + HTTP(S) allowlists from servers; block unknown cloud storage clients.
- Email/Web: Inline sandboxing, URL rewriting with time-of-click analysis; DMARC/DKIM/SPF enforced.
- Patch KEV: Prioritize edge & remote-management tooling; maintain a 7–14-day SLA for internet-facing services.
7) Ransom Note & Artifact Clues (generic)
- Note names often follow patterns like
INTERLOCK-README.txtorHOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt. - Extensions may be unique per build/campaign; do not rely on extension strings alone—hunt the behaviors above.
- Encryption usually precedes note write → the mass-file-touch signal is the earliest high-fidelity indicator.
Avoid chasing static IOCs—operators re-brand quickly. Ground your defenses in techniques and process behaviors.
8) Governance & Board Metrics
- MTTD/MTTR (endpoint + server + cloud).
- % of assets with EDR and tamper protection.
- % of backups immutable and offline; restore time validation.
- Patch SLA: KEV/internet-facing vulns within 7 days.
- Identity risk: % with FIDO2, conditional access coverage, PAM adoption.
- Lateral-movement risk: SMB signing enforced, RDP restricted, LAPS coverage.
9) CyberDudeBivash Services (we do the heavy lifting)
- Managed Detection & Response (MDR/XDR) — 24×7 monitoring + threat hunting
- Rapid CVE Triage & Patch Orchestration (24–48h SLAs)
- Zero-Trust & PAM deployments (RDP/VPN/remote tools off the internet)
- Immutable Backup & DR validation
- DevSecOps & Secure App Builds (SBOM, provenance, secrets)
Book a 30-min assessment → cyberdudebivash.com
Helpful tools (affiliate CTAs)
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Start Falcon XDR - 1Password Business — Secrets Automation — protect service creds, backup keys, and automation tokens.
Secure secrets with 1Password Business - Aqua Security (CNAPP) — runtime policy for containers/K8s; guardrails against data exfil paths.
Deploy Aqua Security - Snyk — scan code/containers/IaC; break the build on critical vulns.
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