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Publish Date: 18-09-2025
Summary
- Vulnerability ID: CVE-2025-59050
- Affected Software: Greenshot ≤ version 1.3.300 (including GUI and any installed application using
Greenshot.exe) - Vulnerability Type: Insecure deserialization via
WM_COPYDATAIPC message handler - Impact: Local arbitrary code execution (RCE) at user level; attacker needs a local process, but exploit is relatively simple
- Current Status: Proof-of-Concept (PoC) released; patched in version 1.3.301
What You Need to Know
- The vulnerability allows a local process (which could be user-owned or via a compromised app) to send a crafted
WM_COPYDATAmessage containing serialized .NET data, deserialized by Greenshot usingBinaryFormatter.Deserializewithout validation. This can be used to execute attacker-controlled code. - Many organizations use Greenshot (screenshot & annotation utility) as a lightweight tool. It’s often assumed non-threatening, which amplifies the risk.
Urgent Action Required
- Patch now to Greenshot version 1.3.301 (or newer) — install across all managed endpoints.
- Inventory where Greenshot is installed: find version numbers, locations, usage patterns.
- Block or monitor IPC (
WM_COPYDATA) from untrusted or unknown processes to Greenshot.exe. - Set up EDR / endpoint rules to detect unexpected child processes spawned by Greenshot, or unusual file writes after Greenshot activity.
Detection & Indicators
- Unusual IPC (WM_COPYDATA) calls where the sender process is not trusted.
- Greenshot.exe spawning child processes like
cmd.exe,powershell.exe, or other execution binaries. - Creation of
.exe/.dll/.ps1files in user writable folders immediately following Greenshot.exe usage. - Event log entries or security logs showing
SendMessagecalls to Greenshot from other processes. - EDR alerts for deserialization behavior involving
BinaryFormatter.
Recommended Mitigations
- Upgrade to 1.3.301 immediately.
- Restrict permissions: ensure Greenshot is not run elevated, remove unnecessary privileges.
- Apply AppLocker / WDAC policies to control which applications can send messages via
WM_COPYDATA. - Turn on enhanced logging for IPC and newly created child processes from Greenshot.
- Educate users: don’t extract or execute files from untrusted sources or temp directories after screenshot/annotation workflows.
Incident Response Playbook (Quick Version)
| Step | Action |
|---|---|
| Containment | Isolate affected host; disable Greenshot if unpatched. |
| Evidence Collection | Collect logs (IPC, process, file creation), any suspicious binaries or scripts, memory snapshot if possible. |
| Eradication | Remove malicious child processes, start-up entries; apply patch. |
| Recovery | Restore systems from clean backups, verify no persistence left. |
| Review & Prevention | Update detection rules, tighten policies, train users; consider banning or restricting Greenshot if risk judged too high. |
Broader Insight from CyberDudeBivash
This is another example of how “trusted utility tools” are often overlooked in threat modeling. Attackers aren’t always going after big targets — they exploit weak links like screenshot tools, PDF viewers, annotation utilities, etc. Deserialization vulnerabilities in .NET have long been a pattern; responsible devs should avoid unsafe APIs where possible.
References & Further Reading
- Github Advisory: GHSA-8f7f-x7ww-xx5w — Greenshot Security Advisory for CVE-2025-59050
- NVD: CVE-2025-59050 record
- Community write-ups / PoC analysis
#CyberDudeBivash #Greenshot #CVE2025 #WindowsSecurity #RCE #InsecureDeserialization #Alert #PatchNow
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