ICSA-25-261-06 — Cognex In-Sight Explorer & In-Sight Camera Firmware (Multiple CVEs) CyberDudeBivash Authority Report

Executive summary

CISA published advisory ICSA-25-261-06 describing multiple vulnerabilities in Cognex In-Sight Explorer and In-Sight camera firmware (versions in the 5.x → 6.5.1 range). Successful exploitation may allow attackers to disclose sensitive information, steal credentials, or cause denial-of-service on vision systems. Affected devices are commonly used in manufacturing and industrial automation, so availability and integrity impacts are high for OT / ICS environments. CISA

What was disclosed (short)

The advisory covers multiple CVEs affecting both the In-Sight Explorer host software and the firmware running on In-Sight cameras; issues include information disclosure, authentication/authorization weaknesses, and denial-of-service conditions. CISA
Cognex publishes firmware and software updates on their support site — customers should confirm their camera models and In-Sight Explorer versions and follow vendor update guidance. Cognex Support

Who’s at risk

Manufacturing plants, robotics lines, packaging, quality-inspection stations, and any environment that uses Cognex In-Sight cameras for machine-vision inspection. These devices often sit on the factory network and sometimes have management interfaces exposed to engineering or corporate networks — increasing blast radius if compromised. CISA

Affected versions / assets (how to quickly inventory)

Use your asset inventory & network scans to find:
- In-Sight cameras running firmware up to 6.5.1 (check model-specific firmware matrices).
- Workstations running In-Sight Explorer (developer/engineer PCs).
Cognex maintains firmware/software download pages and release notes — cross-reference installed versions against vendor updates. Cognex Support+1

Likely attacker goals & abuse cases

Information disclosure: read configuration files, firmware info, or captured images (may expose sensitive process data).
Credential theft: access saved management credentials, service account tokens, or SNMP/RPC credentials used by vision systems.
Denial-of-Service: crash or brick camera or disrupt image capture, halting automated inspection and production.
Persistence / supply-chain abuse: modify firmware or inject backdoors into processing flows and saved jobs.

Detection signals & hunt playbook (SOC / OT ops)

High-value telemetry to collect

Camera management logs (In-Sight syslog / event logs).
In-Sight Explorer application logs on engineering PCs.
Network flows between cameras and management hosts (API/HTTP, FTP/TFTP, SMB) and any unexpected outbound connections from camera IPs.
File system monitoring for changes to camera-related configuration files or unexpected firmware upload events.

Starter SIEM hunts (adapt to your fields)

A) Detect firmware upload / config push events

index=syslog OR index=camera_logs
| where message matches "firmware upload" OR message contains "update firmware" OR message contains "config replace"
| stats count by host, user, _time

B) Detect unexpected management access from unusual hosts

index=network_flows
| where dest_port IN (80,443,21,69,502) AND dest_ip IN ([camera_ip_list])
| where src_ip NOT IN (approved_engineering_subnets)
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port

C) Detect repeated camera reboots or availability loss

index=polling_status
| stats count by camera_id, status
| where status="offline" AND count > threshold within 10m

D) File integrity / artifact detection

Alert on new .job, .prj, or unknown binary blobs written to camera storage or management shares.

Immediate mitigation (what to do in first 24–72 hours)

Inventory & isolate: Identify all In-Sight devices and In-Sight Explorer hosts; isolate cameras from untrusted networks (apply ACLs) if possible. Cognex Support
Patch urgently: Follow Cognex/CISA guidance and apply vendor fixes for affected firmware/software versions as a priority. If vendor patch is not immediately available for a model, apply compensating controls below. CISA+1
Lock down management interfaces: Restrict access to camera management ports (HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, TFTP, SMB, etc.) to a limited set of administration hosts via firewall rules or network segmentation.
Rotate credentials: Change management passwords and any credentials stored for cameras (API keys, SNMP community strings, service accounts). Treat exposed credentials as compromised if you observed suspicious access.
Disable unnecessary services: Turn off FTP/TFTP/SMB or any unused management protocols on cameras and engineer workstations.
Increase logging & retention: Ensure camera and In-Sight Explorer logs are retained centrally for at least 90 days for forensic capability.

Medium / longer-term controls (1–12 weeks)

Network segmentation: Place vision systems on a dedicated VLAN with strict egress rules; only allow required traffic to PLCs/HMIs and management hosts.
Harden engineering workstations: Patch OS & In-Sight Explorer, run EDR, restrict developer tools to trusted accounts, block risky binaries.
Deploy WAF / reverse proxy for management interfaces (if camera management must be accessible remotely) to filter malformed requests.
Implement strong credential management: store camera/service creds in a secrets vault; remove any plaintext credentials from configs.
Firmware integrity / allowlisting: where possible, validate firmware signatures and keep golden firmware images offline.
Regular vulnerability scanning: include cameras in internal scans and follow Cognex advisories for new CVEs.

Incident response checklist (if you suspect compromise)

Isolate affected camera(s) — pull network cable or place in quarantine VLAN.
Preserve logs & memory (if device supports it) — collect management logs, FTP/TFTP transfer records, and In-Sight Explorer session records.
Collect forensic images of device storage and any uploaded job files or unexpected binaries.
Rotate credentials used for camera management and any systems the camera communicates with.
Rebuild or reimage camera firmware from a known-good vendor image if compromise confirmed.
Notify stakeholders & regulators as required (especially if PII/process IP was exposed).
Post-incident: run root-cause analysis and harden configuration to prevent recurrence.

Communication guidance for ops & execs

For OT leaders: emphasize availability risk — camera compromise can halt production lines; prioritize patching and segmentation budgets.
For legal/comms: prepare notifications if IP or regulated data may have been captured by compromised vision systems.
For procurement: require vendor SLAs for firmware security and a clear vulnerability response process from OEMs.

Quick playbook summary (priority list)

Inventory all Cognex In-Sight devices + In-Sight Explorer hosts. Cognex Support
Apply vendor patches (per CISA/Cognex advisory). CISA+1
Isolate & firewall camera management interfaces.
Rotate all related credentials and revoke exposed API tokens.
Monitor for abnormal reboots, firmware uploads, or unexpected outgoing connections.

References (primary)

CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-25-261-06 — Cognex In-Sight Explorer and In-Sight Camera Firmware. CISA
Cognex In-Sight software & firmware support/downloads — check model firmware pages for updates. Cognex Support+1

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