
Executive Summary
- Threat name: Shai-Hulud — a newly identified self-replicating malware family.
- Category: Worm / self-propagating malware with hybrid traits (worm + ransomware).
- Propagation: Exploits network misconfigs, lateral movement via SMB/RDP/SSH, plus malicious document/email vectors.
- Risks: Rapid spread across enterprise networks, privilege escalation, potential data destruction/encryption.
- Notable trait: Payload re-seeds itself persistently, even after partial clean-up.
- Action now: Segment networks, apply strict credential hygiene, implement EDR policies for worm heuristics, patch exposed services, and prepare incident response playbooks.
Technical Overview
- Infection vector: phishing attachments, malicious macros, weaponized PDF/Office docs.
- Self-replication:
- Scans subnets for open ports (445/3389/22).
- Brute-forces weak creds and re-deploys binary.
- Creates scheduled tasks / systemd services for persistence.
- Payload actions:
- Keylogging + credential harvesting.
- Optional ransomware module encrypts critical files.
- Backdoor channel via HTTP(S) or DNS tunneling.
- Resilience: kills AV/EDR processes, mutates file hashes, re-seeds itself from infected peers.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
- Initial Access: Phishing (T1566), Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190).
- Execution: User Execution (T1204), Command-Line Interface (T1059).
- Persistence: Scheduled Task/Job (T1053), Systemd Service (Linux).
- Privilege Escalation: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068).
- Lateral Movement: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002), SSH (T1021.004).
- Impact: Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486).
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
Files/Hashes (samples):
- shaihulud.dll
- wormloader.exe
/tmp/.shaihulud
Network:
- Outbound traffic to domains with “sandworm[.]” or “arrakis[.]” strings.
- Repeated DNS queries for TXT records (used for C2).
Behavioral:
- Rapid creation of scheduled tasks across multiple endpoints.
- Sudden spike in SMB/SSH login failures followed by successes.
- EDR/AV tamper attempts.
Threat Hunting Playbook
Splunk Query — Detect abnormal SMB brute force
index=wineventlog EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624
| stats count by src_ip, dest_host, user
| where count > 100 within 5 minutes
Elastic Detection Rule
event.dataset:"authentication" AND (event.outcome:"failure" OR event.outcome:"success")
AND service.name:"smb"
Sigma Rule (EDR Tampering)
title: Shai-Hulud Malware AV/EDR Tamper
logsource: windows
detection:
selection:
EventID: 7036
ServiceName|contains:
- "Defender"
- "EDR"
condition: selection
level: high
Response & Containment
- Isolate infected hosts immediately.
- Block known IoCs at firewall/proxy.
- Rotate credentials for compromised accounts.
- Rebuild hosts (due to persistence).
- Check backups (ensure clean restore points).
- Communicate & escalate — legal, compliance, insurance.
Long-Term Mitigation
- Network segmentation (stop worm propagation).
- MFA for remote access (VPN/RDP/SSH).
- Disable SMBv1; restrict RDP exposure.
- Continuous vulnerability patching.
- Endpoint hardening with behavioral EDR rules.
- Regular incident response exercises simulating worm outbreaks.
#CyberDudeBivash #ShaiHulud #SelfReplicatingMalware #Worm #Ransomware #ThreatIntel #EDR #IncidentResponse #ZeroTrust #MalwareAnalysis
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