
CODE RED • SUPPLY CHAIN RISK
Security Nightmare: Vulnerability in Kibana Connector Leaks High-Value CrowdStrike Credentials
By CyberDudeBivash • October 07, 2025 • Urgent Security Directive
cyberdudebivash.com | cyberbivash.blogspot.com
Disclosure: This is a security advisory for security professionals. It contains affiliate links to relevant enterprise security solutions. Your support helps fund our independent research.
Emergency Guide: Table of Contents
- Chapter 1: The Threat Analysis — The Stored XSS in the Kibana Connector
- Chapter 2: The Kill Chain — From a Single XSS to Disabling Your Entire EDR
- Chapter 3: The Defender’s Playbook — Immediate Containment, Revocation, and Patching
- Chapter 4: The Strategic Takeaway — The Risk of Third-Party Integrations
Chapter 1: The Threat Analysis — The Stored XSS in the Kibana Connector (CVE-2025-45680)
A critical **Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability, tracked as **CVE-2025-45680**, has been discovered in a popular third-party Kibana connector used for ingesting data from the CrowdStrike Falcon platform. This is a nightmare scenario where a vulnerability in your SIEM/observability platform becomes the direct vector for compromising your core EDR/XDR security platform.
The Exploit:
An attacker with low-privileged access to Kibana can inject a malicious JavaScript payload into a configuration field of the connector, such as the “Connector Name.” The application fails to sanitize this input and stores the script in its database. When a high-privileged Kibana administrator later navigates to the connector’s configuration page to view or edit it, the malicious script automatically executes in their browser, with the full permissions of their authenticated session.
Chapter 2: The Kill Chain — From a Single XSS to Disabling Your Entire EDR
The attacker’s goal is to steal the CrowdStrike API keys, which are often displayed in plaintext within the connector’s configuration page.
- **XSS Execution:** The administrator views the page, and the attacker’s script runs.
- **Credential Theft:** The script uses JavaScript to read the values directly from the API Key and Secret form fields on the page (e.g., `document.getElementById(‘api_key_field’).value`).
- **Exfiltration:** The script exfiltrates these stolen credentials to a remote server controlled by the attacker.
- **The “God Mode” Impact:** The attacker now possesses administrative API keys to your CrowdStrike Falcon platform. They can:
- Create exclusion policies to make their malware and TTPs invisible to the EDR.
- Systematically uninstall the Falcon sensor from every endpoint in your organization.
- Delete or tamper with evidence and incident reports.
- Disable host containment and other response actions.
Chapter 3: The Defender’s Playbook — Immediate Containment, Revocation, and Patching
You must act immediately. Assume you are compromised.
Step 1: REVOKE YOUR CROWDSTRIKE API KEYS
This is your most critical and urgent action. Log in to your CrowdStrike Falcon console **immediately**. Navigate to the API Clients and Keys section, identify the keys used by the vulnerable Kibana connector, and **REVOKE them now.** Generate a new set of keys to be used *after* you have patched the connector.
Step 2: PATCH the Kibana Connector
The vendor has released an emergency patch for the connector. You must apply this update to your Kibana instance without delay.
Step 3: HUNT for Malicious Activity
After revoking the keys, you must hunt for signs that they were abused.
- **In CrowdStrike:** Audit the Falcon API logs for any activity from unexpected IP addresses. Scrutinize the audit log for any recent, unauthorized changes to prevention policies, new exclusions, or sensor uninstall commands.
- **In Kibana:** Scan your Kibana configuration database for any dashboards or connector settings that contain suspicious `
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