
New Phishing Attack Using Invisible Characters Hidden in Subject Line Using MIME Encoding
By CyberDudeBivash · 30 Oct 2025 · cyberbivash.blogspot.com · cyberdudebivash.com

LinkedIn: ThreatWire cryptobivash.code.blog
Heads-up: Attackers are inserting invisible Unicode (e.g., zero-width/soft-hyphen) into MIME-encoded email subjects to break keyword-based filters and slip phishing mail into inboxes. Recent samples split the subject across multiple =?UTF-8?B?...?= chunks to hide terms like “password”/“invoice”.
This guide explains how the trick works, why your secure email gateway can miss it, and the exact detections, header rules, and user-awareness updates you should ship today.
TL;DR — Subject lines get obfuscated with invisible Unicode inside MIME encoded-words (RFC 2047). Some filters see “Invo…ce”; your client renders “Invoice”. Block mixed CL/TE? Great — but also normalize/strip zero-width & soft-hyphen from headers, and alert on multi-segment Subject: headers. Contents
- How the Attack Works
- Detections & Header Rules
- SIEM/XDR Hunts
- User Awareness: What to Teach
- Recommended Tools (Partner Links)
- CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps
- Sources
- FAQ
How the Attack Works
- MIME encoded-word split: Subject is encoded as several
=?UTF-8?B?...?=chunks (limit ≈75 chars each) to hide terms when filters don’t reconstruct correctly. - Invisible Unicode insertion: Zero-width space (
U+200B) or soft-hyphen (U+00AD) get Base64-encoded inside those chunks. Mail clients render a clean word; some filters miss the keyword match. - Bypass impact: Inbox delivery rises; users see “Invoice overdue” while back-end scanners saw “Invoice overdue”. Recent reports show live campaigns using this technique.
Detections & Header Rules
- Normalize headers: Strip/replace
U+200B,U+00AD,U+200C,U+200D,U+2060inSubject:,From:,Reply-To:before policy checks. - Alert on multi-segment subjects: Flag >1 encoded-word in
Subject:especially mixed encodings or inconsistent charsets. - Disallow control-like code points: Block emails where header decoded text contains bidirectional or invisible characters.
- Header length heuristics: Unusual ratio of encoded length to decoded length, or subjects with many hyphenation points (soft-hyphen patterns).
- SPF/DKIM/DMARC: Enforce p=quarantine/reject; mismatch + header anomalies = elevate to high risk.
SIEM/XDR Hunts (generic)
- Mail gateway: search for
Subject:containing=?UTF-8?B?repeated 2+ times; decode and diff decoded vs rendered. - User clicks: spikes on messages where decoded subject contains terms like “invoice”, “password”, “DocuSign” but original header had ZWSP/soft-hyphen.
- Web telemetry: referers from mail clients to newly registered domains; blocklisted TLDs + first-seen domains.
User Awareness: What to Teach
- Be suspicious of urgent subjects that look slightly “off” (odd spacing, hyphenation, or gibberish when copied).
- Verify sender domain carefully; watch for homoglyph look-alikes (Latin vs Cyrillic “a/o”).
- Never enter credentials from an email link; open the site directly or use a known bookmark.
Recommended by CyberDudeBivash (Partner Links)
Boost filtering, detection, and training fast:
Kaspersky EDR/XDR
Correlate mail events with endpoint/browser signalsEdureka — Email Security & DFIR
Hands-on training for your SecOps teamTurboVPN
Secure admin access while tuning mail gateways
Alibaba Cloud (Global)
Spin up safe sandboxes for mail pipeline testsAliExpress (Global)
Security keys & lab gear for phishing drillsRewardful
Run your customer referral program securely
CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps
We can harden your mail stack now: header normalization, SEG tuning, DMARC enforcement, brand-spoof hunts, and staff training.
- PhishRadar AI — detects obfuscated subjects/URLs & prompt-injection
- SessionShield — protects admin sessions & mail admin consoles
- Threat Analyser GUI — dashboards & correlation for mail events
Explore Apps & ProductsBook Email Security SprintSubscribe to ThreatWire
Sources
- SANS ISC: recent phishing with invisible characters in subject (soft-hyphen + multi-segment MIME).
- CybersecurityNews: attacker implementation via RFC 2047 encoded-words with Base64 UTF-8 examples.
- Microsoft Security Blog: trend of inserting invisible Unicode to break keyword detection.
- RFC 2047 guidance (encoded-word limits & splitting).
- Background: zero-width/soft-hyphen characters & prior email obfuscation techniques.
FAQ
Q: Is this a client bug?
A: Not exactly. Clients decode/compose per spec; the gap is when filters fail to normalize/fully decode before policy checks.
Q: Will URL rewriting alone stop it?
A: No. The lure is the subject; you must sanitize headers and hunt for encoded-word abuse. Prior ZWSP tricks also bypassed some URL protections.
Next Reads
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