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Published by CyberDudeBivash • Date: Nov 1, 2025 (IST)

How Lampion Stealer’s “ClickFix” Attack Bypasses Your EDR and MFA

Recent Lampion campaigns pair classic banking-stealer tradecraft with ClickFix—a social-engineering technique that convinces users to paste or run attacker-supplied commands themselves. This user-initiated execution lets attacks slide past automated EDR controls and can undermine MFA through token theft and OAuth abuse. CyberDudeBivash Ecosystem:Apps & Services · CyberBivash (Threat Intel) · CryptoBivash · News Portal · Subscribe: ThreatWire

TL;DR — Why This Works Against EDR & MFA

ClickFix ≠ exploit, it’s consent-as-execution: Phishing or malvertising funnels victims to a landing page that instructs them to copy/paste or run a command (PowerShell/Run dialog/File Explorer path). Because the user does it, automated defenses may not block it.
Lampion rides this vector: Unit 42 and others document Lampion’s evolving chains; 2025 waves used “ClickFix-style” lures to deliver stealers/RATs with minimal artifacts.
MFA still loses if tokens/consent are stolen: Campaigns that pair ClickFix with OAuth-app impersonation or session theft can bypass MFA by abusing tokens/refresh tokens after the prompt.

1) The Lampion + ClickFix Attack Chain

Lure: Email/malvertising pushes a “fix,” “report,” or “verification” page (sometimes fake CAPTCHA). Page shows a copy button and step-by-step “paste into PowerShell/Run/File Explorer” instructions.
User-initiated execution: The pasted string triggers PowerShell/LOLBins to fetch and launch the payload with minimal on-disk footprint.
Payload: Lampion/affiliate chains drop info-stealers (bank creds, email, browser data) and/or RATs; recent rounds target Portugal and broader regions.
Variants: “FileFix” is a sibling that abuses File Explorer path bar to execute hidden PowerShell when victims paste a “path.”

2) Why EDR Misses It

User did it: Microsoft notes ClickFix relies on visual consent—the victim literally runs the command, reducing obvious exploit telemetry and sidestepping many “drive-by” or macro detections.
LOLBins + short chain: McAfee and Proofpoint show copy-paste chains with in-memory PowerShell and trusted binaries—few binaries to hash/flag; commands look “admin-ish.”
Browser-to-endpoint gap: Attack begins in the browser; by the time endpoint tools see something, it’s “user-approved.” Vendors have started adding browser-layer detections to close that gap.

3) How MFA Gets Bypassed

Token theft > password theft: Stealers like Lampion aim at session cookies/tokens; once obtained, they enable access post-MFA until tokens are invalidated.
OAuth app impersonation: Separate but related tracks show attackers abusing fake Microsoft OAuth apps to obtain consented tokens—no MFA prompt after consent. Pair that with ClickFix delivery and you have a resilient bypass.

4) Detections & Hunts (Windows-centric)

EDR/SIEM queries (concepts—tune before prod)

# 1) Copy-paste PowerShell from GUI → suspicious child chains
EventID=4688 AND ParentImage IN ("*\\explorer.exe","*\\msedge.exe","*\\chrome.exe","*\\firefox.exe")
AND (NewProcessName="*\\powershell.exe" OR CommandLine LIKE "%-enc %" OR CommandLine LIKE "%IEX%")

# 2) Run dialog / File Explorer path bar abuse
EventID=4688 AND ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" AND
(NewProcessName="*\\powershell.exe" OR CommandLine LIKE "%Get-FileHash%http%" OR CommandLine LIKE "%Start-BitsTransfer%")

# 3) Suspicious clipboard use + PS
EventID=4104 (PowerShell) AND ScriptBlockText LIKE "%FromBase64String%" AND
ScriptBlockText LIKE "%Invoke-WebRequest%"

Network/Proxy

Cluster short-lived outbound fetches immediately after a user visited a “fix/verify” page; flag first-seen domains with copy-paste UI.

Browser layer (where supported)

Detect malicious copy-to-clipboard scripts and patterns tied to ClickFix/FileFix landing pages. (Vendors are adding this control.)

5) Mitigations & Policy Fixes (Do These Now)

Block copy-paste attack strings: Add secure-browser policies/extensions that inspect clipboard writes from untrusted sites and warn/strip suspicious Base64/PowerShell.
Constrain PowerShell with Constrained Language Mode/AppLocker; require signing for enterprise scripts; alert on powershell.exe spawned by explorer.exe/browser.
Harden MFA with token hygiene: Shorten session lifetimes, enable continuous access evaluation (CAE), monitor risky OAuth consents, and auto-revoke refresh tokens on anomaly.
Awareness > AV: Roll targeted training on ClickFix/FileFix with screenshots; HHS and Proofpoint advisories include IOC patterns and mitigations.
Browser isolation for high-risk roles (finance, HR, help desk) to neuter web-to-endpoint command bridges.
IOC ingestion: Track current Lampion indicators from recent reports; auto-block resolver and first-seen infra tied to lures.

FAQ

Is ClickFix a vulnerability in Windows or browsers?

No—it’s a technique. The page persuades the user to execute commands, which many tools treat as legitimate admin activity. That’s why EDR coverage alone isn’t enough.

Is Lampion the only family using ClickFix?

No. Researchers document ClickFix being used to deliver NetSupport RAT, Lumma, Latrodectus, StealC and more; state-aligned actors have adopted it too.

How exactly does MFA get “bypassed” here?

After a successful MFA challenge, session tokens and OAuth consents can be abused. If a stealer or rogue OAuth app grabs tokens, the attacker can access accounts without re-prompting the user for MFA.

Sources

Microsoft Security — “Think before you Click(Fix)” (attack chain & rationale).
Palo Alto Unit 42 — Lampion campaigns & ClickFix-style lures in 2025.
Proofpoint — ClickFix technique flooding the landscape; adoption by multiple actors.
McAfee Labs — original “Clickfix” copy-paste infection chain analysis.
US HHS Sector Alert (TLP:CLEAR) — ClickFix overview, IOCs, mitigations.
Push Security — browser-layer detections for ClickFix-style delivery.
Microsoft/Proofpoint — OAuth impersonation campaigns that bypass MFA with consented tokens.
Microsoft Threat Intel — Booking.com imitations delivering stealers via ClickFix.
Tom’s Guide — “FileFix” variant abusing File Explorer path bar to launch PowerShell/StealC.

CyberDudeBivash — Services, Apps & Ecosystem

Browser-Layer Threat Protection (ClickFix/FileFix countermeasures, secure browser rollout)
Detection Engineering (EDR + SIEM rules for user-initiated PowerShell & OAuth abuse)
Incident Response (token purge, OAuth consent hunting, account takeover containment)

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