Published by CyberDudeBivash • Date: Nov 1, 2025 (IST)

Your Third-Party Risk is Showing: CISO Briefing on the Airstalk Malware Supply Chain Attack

A newly-discovered malware family dubbed Airstalk (activity cluster CL‑STA‑1009) is being used in sophisticated supply chain attacks that exploit the VMware AirWatch / Workspace ONE UEM API to exfiltrate browser data, credentials and secrets — through third-party vendor environments or BPO partners. This CISO briefing explains what happened, why it matters for your third-party risk posture, and what you must do in the next 30-60-90 days.CyberDudeBivash Ecosystem:Apps & Services · CyberBivash (Threat Intel) · CryptoBivash · News Portal · Subscribe: ThreatWire

TL;DR — What Every CISO Must Know

New malware family Airstalk: Targets Windows hosts via vendor/BPO supply-chain, abuses AirWatch UEM API for covert C2 and exfiltration of browser cookies, history and screenshots.
Third-party/BPO risk spotlighted: The malware is designed to live in vendor or outsourcer environments, then pivot into client networks.
CISO action agenda: Audit vendor MDM access, enforce strict API logging, hunt for C2 via MDM APIs, segment trust zones, and raise vendor risk KPIs.

1) What is Airstalk? Key Findings

Research from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identifies a new Windows-based malware family named Airstalk, available in both PowerShell and .NET variants.

The attack uses the AirWatch / Workspace ONE UEM API — in particular endpoints such as /api/mdm/devices/ and /api/mam/blobs/uploadblob — to carry out covert C2 and file upload/exfiltration tasks.

Capabilities include: screenshot capture, browser cookie/history/bookmark theft, file enumeration, stealth persistence (especially in .NET variant).

Researchers assess with medium confidence that this is a supply-chain attack targeting business process outsourcing (BPO) or vendor environments — cluster named CL-STA-1009.

2) Why It Matters to Your Organization

Vendor pivot risk: If a vendor’s managed devices are compromised (with UEM/API access), attackers can use those credentials or trusted devices to gain access to multiple downstream clients.
Stealthy exfiltration: Use of legitimate MDM API traffic means traditional network sensors may miss the C2 and exfil flows. Storage of browser cookies/bookmarks = lateral access capability to user sessions.
Regulatory &-compliance impact: If vendor devices store client PII or session tokens, breach of vendor ecosystem triggers your incident, not just theirs.
Trust boundary erosion: Your supply chain becomes part of your exposure perimeter — you must treat vendor devices/management APIs as part of your risk domain.

3) Third-Party Risk & BPO Exposure

Airstalk’s design shows clear targeting of vendor/BPO models: researchers note “particularly disastrous for organisations that use BPO because stolen browser session cookies could allow access to a large number of their clients.”

Key risk vectors:

Vendor devices enrolled in your UEM but out-of-scope for your direct controls (unless you mandate visibility).
Vendor access to API endpoints for device management, update processes and telemetry ingestion — these can be turned into covert C2 channels.
Shared credentials, weak API token segregation, insufficient monitoring of vendor-side devices and cloud services.

Therefore your third-party risk management must include: whether vendors have device fleets, whether those fleets have access to your tenancy, whether vendor credentials have wide lateral reach — this attack demands those questions be revisited now.

4) Detection & Hunt Strategies (MDM, Endpoint, Network)

MDM/API Layer

# Example SIEM query pseudocode:
let mgmtCalls = ApiLogs
| where ApiEndpoint in ("/api/mdm/devices","/api/mam/blobs/uploadblob")
| where ActorPrincipalType == "VendorServiceAccount"
| where callCount > 100 and DestinationCountry not in ("US","JP","UK")
| project TimeGenerated, Actor, Endpoint, ClientDeviceId
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Alert on unusual volume of device-attribute updates or blob uploads from vendor tokens/devices.

Endpoint / Host

# Suspicious process launch by vendor-trained MDM agent:
ProcessCreation
| where ParentImage contains "AirWatchAgent.exe" OR "WorkspaceONEAgent.exe"
| and NewProcessName in ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe")
| and CommandLine contains "-exec" or "-upload"

Hunt for suspicious child processes of MDM agents or unexpected outbound connections from vendor-devices.

Network / Egress

Monitor traffic from vendor device subnets to unusual endpoints or C2 domains; focus on encrypted blob uploads via known MDM domains.
Inspect for /api/mam/blobs/uploadblob calls that originate from unexpected IPs or exceed normal volume thresholds.

5) Mitigations: Vendor Controls, MDM API Hardening, Supply Chain Hygiene

Vendor device inventory: Require all vendors/BPOs to disclose fleets enrolled in your UEM/MDM; map which devices and tokens have your access.
Token & API management: Implement least-privilege vendor tokens; rotate regularly; apply conditional access (MFA, geolocation); restrict MDM API scope to only what’s needed.
Network segmentation: Place vendor-managed devices and management consoles in a restricted zone; treat them as semi-untrusted; limit lateral access to your environment.
API logging and anomaly detection: Enable full logging for UEM APIs; feed into SIEM/UEBA; baseline “normal” vendor device behaviour and alert on deviations.
Third-party audits & attestation: Include vendor security in SLAs; require independent penetration tests, supply-chain assurance, and breach notification clause including your downstream impact.
Containment plans: Pre-define vendor isolation processes; if a vendor device is compromised, you must have ability to block their API tokens, unenroll devices, revoke access quickly.

6) CISO 30-60-90 Day Rollout Plan

Day 0-30: Assess & Contain

List all third-party vendors/BPOs with device fleets or UEM/MDM integration; categorize by risk and access level.
Audit your UEM/MDM-API access logs for vendor-token usage in past 90 days; look for spike patterns or unusual device attribute writes.
Apply immediate containment: enforce vendor token rotation, restrict blobs/uploads volumes and refactor vendor device network segmentation.

Day 31-60: Strengthen & Monitor

Deploy the detection queries above (MDM/API, endpoint, network) and integrate into your SIEM/UEBA.
Update your third-party risk program: require vendor fleets to report agent versions, token use, device enrolment metrics; include sandbox testing of vendor-device behaviour.
Segment vendor device zones, apply tighter conditional access, limit lateral movement and enforce jump-host/zero-trust pattern for vendor admin access.

Day 61-90: Audit & Continuously Improve

Run full tabletop / red-team scenario: “Vendor device compromised → your client session cookie stolen → access pivot to your network.” Validate your containment and incident response flow.
Measure vendor-risk KPIs: % devices in vendor fleets compliant; number of vendor-token rotations; mean time to revoke vendor access when anomaly detected.
Update contract templates to include mandatory breach simulation, device telemetry sharing, and third-party trust audits at least annually.

FAQ

Is this relevant only to vendors with device fleets?

No. Even vendors without fleets but with API integrations (UEM/MDM, update services, telemetry, logging agents) are part of your supply-chain risk. Attackers can exploit any indirect trust channel.

Should we block all vendor device enrolment?

Not necessarily. But you must treat vendor-devices as “semi-trusted” and apply zero-trust controls: minimal access, segmentation, logging, and rapid revocation mechanisms.

What’s the single most effective control right now?

Enforce least-privilege MDM/API tokens for vendors and apply tight network segmentation so vendor-managed devices cannot freely access client networks or cloud consoles.

Sources

Unit 42: “Suspected Nation-State Threat Actor Uses New Airstalk Malware in a Supply Chain Attack” (Oct 29 2025)
The Hacker News: “New Airstalk Malware in a Supply Chain Attack” (Oct 31 2025)
CyberPress / GBHackers coverage of Airstalk and target analysis.

CyberDudeBivash — Services, Apps & Ecosystem

Third-Party Risk & Supply-Chain Cyber Program Design (vendor device audit, API access review, token governance)
Detection Engineering (MDM API anomaly detection, vendor-fleet telemetry, vendor device segmentation analytics)
Incident Response (vendor-device compromise playbook, supply-chain breach scenario simulation, vendor token revocation plan)

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