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CISO Briefing: Chinese APT (UNC6384) is Targeting Europe. Is Your EDR Ready for the “Canon DLL Sideloading” Trick? — by CyberDudeBivash

By CyberDudeBivash · 01 Nov 2025 · cyberdudebivash.com · Intel on cyberbivash.blogspot.com

LinkedIn: ThreatWirecryptobivash.code.blog

APT • EDR BYPASS • DLL SIDELOADING • THREAT HUNTING

Situation: A Chinese APT (UNC6384) is actively targeting European enterprises with a sophisticated EDR bypass technique. This TTP (Tactic, Technique, and Procedure) is a “Bring Your Own Vulnerable Executable” attack, using a *legitimate, signed* Canon printer utility to perform a DLL Sideloading attack, achieving fileless, in-memory execution of a C2 beacon.

This is a decision-grade CISO brief. This attack is designed to *specifically* defeat your “Next-Gen” Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). Your security stack is *whitelisted* to trust the signed `canon.exe` process, making it *blind* to the malicious DLL it loads. This is a “Living off the Trusted Land” (LotL) attack, and we are providing the Threat Hunting playbook to find it.

TL;DR — A Chinese APT is bypassing EDR by hiding malware inside a *trusted Canon printer app*.

• The TTP: DLL Sideloading. The attacker drops *two* files: 1) A *legitimate, signed* `canon.exe` file. 2) A *malicious* `version.dll` file in the *same folder*.
• The Bypass: Windows loads the *malicious* DLL *before* the real one. Your EDR sees a *trusted, signed* `canon.exe` process start and *ignores* it.
• The Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) in a “trusted” memory space. This is used for corporate espionage and data exfiltration.
• Why Defenses Fail: Your EDR is whitelisting the signed executable. Your firewall is whitelisting the outbound traffic from that “trusted” process.
• THE ACTION: 1) Harden (Use AppLocker/WDAC to block EXEs from running in temp/user folders). 2) Hunt (This is the mandate. Hunt for anomalous process chains and network traffic from *non-standard* apps). 3) Verify (Run a Red Team simulation of this TTP).

Contents

1. Phase 1: The “Trusted” Exploit (What is DLL Sideloading?)
2. Phase 2: The Kill Chain (From Phish to C2 Beacon)
3. Phase 3: PostMortem – Why Your EDR Was 100% Blind
4. The CISO Mandate: A 3-Step “Harden, Hunt, Verify” Plan
5. Tools We Recommend (Partner Links)
6. CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps
7. FAQ

Phase 1: The “Trusted” Exploit (What is DLL Sideloading?)

To understand why this attack works, you must understand a fundamental flaw in the Windows operating system. This is not a “bug”; it’s a “feature” that has been exploited for decades.

When a Windows executable (like `canon.exe`) starts, it needs to load its “dependencies” (Dynamic Link Libraries, or `.dll` files) like `version.dll` or `oci.dll`. By default, Windows has a “search order”:

1. 1. The application’s own directory.
2. 2. The system directories (e.g., `C:\Windows\System32`).

This is the vulnerability.

The UNC6384 attackers *know* that `canon.exe` is a legitimate, signed application that tries to load a file called `version.dll`. They also know it’s *vulnerable* (it doesn’t specify the *full path* to the *correct* DLL).

The attacker “brings their own vulnerable executable” (BYOVD). They drop *both* the legitimate `canon.exe` and their *own malicious* `version.dll` into the same folder (e.g., `C:\Users\victim\AppData\Local\Temp\`).

When the attacker runs `canon.exe`, Windows *follows the search order*. It looks in the application’s *own directory first* (Step 1), finds the *malicious* `version.dll`, and *loads it*. The attacker’s code is now running *inside the memory space of a trusted, signed process*. This is a fileless, in-memory execution that bypasses most static antivirus signatures and EDR whitelisting.

Phase 2: The Kill Chain (From Phish to C2 Beacon)

This is a low-and-slow cyber-espionage campaign. The goal is long-term, covert access, not “loud” ransomware.

Stage 1: Initial Access (The Phish/LNK)

The attack begins with a spear-phishing email or a malicious LNK file, often in a `.zip` archive. The user (e.g., in your finance department in Europe) is tricked into clicking “Urgent_Invoice.pdf.lnk”.

Stage 2: The “Fileless” Dropper

The `.LNK` file executes an obfuscated PowerShell command. This is a “fileless” TTP. This script does two things:

1. It downloads the *legitimate, signed* `canon.exe` from a remote server (or it may already be on disk).
2. It downloads the *malicious* `version.dll` (the C2 beacon) from the same server.
3. It places *both* in a user-writable directory (like `AppData`).

Stage 3: Defense Evasion (The “Bypass”)

The PowerShell script now executes `C:\Users\victim\AppData\Local\Temp\canon.exe`.
Your EDR sees this. It inspects the process. It sees `canon.exe`, checks its signature, and confirms it is a *trusted, signed binary from Canon Inc.* It whitelists the process.

Stage 4: Execution & C2 (The Breach)

The `canon.exe` process, now running, begins to load its DLLs. It follows the search order and finds the malicious `version.dll` (which is in the same folder). It loads this DLL.
The malicious code inside `version.dll` now executes *in the memory of canon.exe*. It beacons out to the attacker’s Command & Control (C2) server.

The game is over. The attacker has a persistent, `SYSTEM`-level (if the service runs as system) or user-level (if the LNK runs as user) backdoor. Your firewall sees “normal” HTTPS traffic from a “trusted” printer utility. Your EDR sees a “trusted” process running. You are 100% blind.

Phase 3: PostMortem – Why Your EDR Was 100% Blind

This is the “CISO PostMortem” question. Why did your multi-million dollar “Next-Gen AI EDR” fail?

It failed because it was configured to *trust* signatures. This is a “Trust” exploit.

• It’s a “Living off the Trusted Land” (LotL) Attack: The initial execution (Stage 2) is `powershell.exe`. The persistent execution (Stage 4) is `canon.exe`. *Both are “trusted” processes.* Your EDR is *designed* to let them run.
• It’s a “Signature-less” Attack: The malicious `version.dll` is custom-compiled by the APT for *your* environment. It has *zero* signatures on VirusTotal. Your AV scanner is useless.
• It’s a “Behavioral” Blind Spot: An out-of-the-box EDR is looking for *known-bad behavior* (e.g., `powershell.exe` -> `Mimikatz`). It is *not* looking for *anomalous-but-plausible* behavior (e.g., `canon.exe` making a network connection).

The CISO Mandate: You MUST have a 24/7 MDR.
An automated EDR is just a “noise generator.” You need a Managed Detection & Response (MDR) service. Our 24/7 CyberDudeBivash SecOps team is trained to hunt for *these specific TTPs*.

We don’t see “noise.” We see a “Priority 1 Incident.” Our hunt query is: “Why is a `canon.exe` process running from an `AppData` folder? And why is it talking to an unknown IP in China?” We see this, identify it as “UNC6384 TTP,” and initiate Incident Response in minutes.
Explore Our 24/7 MDR Service →

The CISO Mandate: A 3-Step “Harden, Hunt, Verify” Plan

You cannot patch this. This is a *TTP*, not a CVE. You must adapt your *strategy*.

1. HARDEN (The “Block”)

This is your most powerful (and most difficult) control. Stop executables from running in user-writable space.
Deploy Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or a similar AppLocker policy. Create a rule that says: “No `.exe` or `.dll` file is allowed to run from `C:\Users\` or `C:\ProgramData\`, *unless* it is in an approved, admin-installed folder.”
This *kills* the LNK/Phish dropper. It *kills* the DLL Sideloading TTP. It is your #1 hardening priority.

2. HUNT (The “Mandate”)

You *must* assume they are already inside. Your *only* defense is to find them. This means you need a 24/7/365 Threat Hunting capability.

• Hunt TTP 1 (The Foothold): “Show me *all* child processes of `powershell.exe -e` (obfuscated) or `cscript.exe`.”
• Hunt TTP 2 (The Anomaly): “Show me *any* process (`canon.exe`, `hp.exe`, `any_legit.exe`) running from a *non-standard path* (e.g., `AppData`, `Temp`).”
• Hunt TTP 3 (The C2): This is your #1 IOC. “Show me all *network connections* from *non-browser, non-system* processes (like `canon.exe`).” Your printer utility should *never* be talking to an IP in China.

This is an active Incident Response (IR) scenario.
If you find *any* of this, you are breached. Call our 24/7 Incident Response hotline. Our digital forensics team will find the malicious DLL, trace the C2, and eradicate the attacker.

3. VERIFY (The “Red Team”)

You have hardened. You are hunting. Does it *work*?
You need to *test* your stack. This is the job of an Adversary Simulation (Red Team). You hire a team of ethical hackers (like us) and give them one command: “Breach us. *Use* DLL Sideloading. *Try* to bypass our EDR. Show us where we are blind.”

Recommended by CyberDudeBivash (Partner Links)

You need a layered defense. Here’s our vetted stack for this specific threat.

Kaspersky EDR
This is your *sensor*. It’s the #1 tool for providing the behavioral telemetry (process chains, network data) that your *human* MDR team needs to hunt.Edureka — Threat Hunting Training
Your SOC team can’t find what they don’t know. Train them *now* on DLL Sideloading TTPs and Threat Hunting.TurboVPN
Secure your admin access. Your RDP/SSH access for *your admins* should be locked down.

Alibaba Cloud (VPC/SEG)
This is *how* you build the “Firewall Jails” (Network Segmentation) to contain the blast radius of a breach.AliExpress (Hardware Keys)
*Mandate* this for all Domain Admins. Get FIDO2/YubiKey-compatible keys. They stop the *initial phish* from succeeding.Rewardful
Run a bug bounty program. Pay white-hats to find flaws *before* APTs do.

CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps

We don’t just report on these threats. We hunt them. We are the “human-in-the-loop” that your automated EDR is missing.

• Managed Detection & Response (MDR): This is the *solution*. Our 24/7 SOC team becomes your Threat Hunters, watching your EDR logs for these *exact* “DLL Sideloading” TTPs.
• Adversary Simulation (Red Team): This is the *proof*. We will simulate this *exact* EDR bypass kill chain to show you where you are blind.
• Emergency Incident Response (IR): You see this TTP? You call us. Our 24/7 team will hunt the attacker and eradicate them.
• PhishRadar AI — Stops the initial spear-phishing email that delivers the Stage 1 LNK foothold.
• SessionShield — Protects your *admin* sessions, so even if the attacker gets `SYSTEM`, we detect their anomalous *session* behavior.

Explore 24/7 MDR ServicesBook an Adversary Simulation (Red Team)Subscribe to ThreatWire

FAQ

Q: What is “DLL Sideloading”?
A: It’s an EDR bypass technique. An attacker “tricks” a *legitimate, signed* executable (like `canon.exe`) into loading a *malicious* DLL by placing it in the same folder. The EDR sees the “trusted” `.exe` and ignores it, while the malicious code runs in its memory.

Q: My EDR has “AI.” Am I safe?
A: No. Not automatically. Your AI is only as good as its configuration. If it’s configured to “trust all signed Canon executables,” it will *miss this*. This attack is designed to *exploit* that trust. You *must* have a *human* MDR team hunting for the *behavioral* anomalies.

Q: How do I hunt for this?
A: You need a behavioral EDR (like Kaspersky). The #1 hunt query is: “Show me all *non-standard* processes (like `canon.exe`) making *outbound network connections*.” Your printer utility shouldn’t be talking to China. Your *second* query is: “Show me all processes running from user-writable paths like `AppData`.”

Q: We were just breached using this TTP! What do we do?
A: 1. Isolate the host(s). 2. Do not turn it off (you will destroy the in-memory evidence). 3. Call our 24/7 Incident Response hotline immediately. We need to perform memory forensics *before* the attacker knows they’ve been spotted.

Next Reads

• [Related Post: The 5 “Fileless” Attack TTPs Your EDR is Missing]
• Daily CVEs & Threat Intel — CyberBivash
• CyberDudeBivash Apps & Services Hub

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