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CISO Briefing: The “TruffleNet” BEC Attack Uses Your Own AWS Account to Steal Your Money. (Your SEG is Blind) — by CyberDudeBivash

By CyberDudeBivash · 01 Nov 2025 · cyberdudebivash.com · Intel on cyberbivash.blogspot.com

LinkedIn: ThreatWire cryptobivash.code.blog

BEC • AWS SES • DMARC BYPASS • SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK

Situation: Business Email Compromise (BEC) has a new, devastating TTP. Named “TruffleNet,” this attack *bypasses* all traditional email defenses (DMARC, SPF, DKIM, SEG) by *using your own trusted infrastructure against you*. The attacker compromises a single AWS API key, hijacks your Amazon SES (Simple Email Service), and sends *internally-spoofed* emails that *originate from your own whitelisted Amazon IP*.

This is a decision-grade CISO brief. This is the ultimate “trusted” attack. Your Secure Email Gateway (SEG) is *designed* to trust your own SES IPs. Your Zero-Trust policy fails because the sender is *authenticated*. This is a critical Cloud Misconfiguration and Supply Chain flaw, and it is the new playbook for wire fraud.

TL;DR — Attackers are sending BEC emails *from inside your own AWS account*.

The TTP: “TruffleNet” = “Leaked AWS Key” + “Amazon SES Hijack” + “Internal BEC.”
The “Zero-Trust Fail”: Your email gateway *trusts* Amazon SES. The email *passes* SPF/DKIM/DMARC. The attack is “trusted” and “undetectable” by standard filters.
The Risk: Catastrophic financial loss from wire fraud, executed from your *own* infrastructure.
THE ACTION: 1) AUDIT your AWS IAM policies for SES. 2) HARDEN all API keys (no public repos!). 3) HUNT for anomalous SES sending patterns.

TTP Factbox: “TruffleNet” BEC

TTP Category	Component	Severity	Exploitability	Mitigation
Credential Abuse	AWS IAM Keys	Critical	Leaked Publicly (GitHub)	Key Rotation / `git-secrets`
Trusted Infrastructure Hijack	Amazon SES	Critical	Bypasses SPF/DMARC	IAM Policy (IP Condition)

Critical Financial RiskBypasses DMARC/SPFCloud Misconfiguration

Risk: This TTP is a “Zero-Trust Fail.” It turns your *own trusted cloud IPs* into a BEC weapon, making your “trusted sender” list your biggest vulnerability.Contents

Phase 1: The “TruffleNet” TTP (Why Your SEG is Obsolete)

For years, CISOs have been told to “trust but verify.” We built our Business Email Compromise (BEC) defense on a simple stack: SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. These protocols *verify* that an email “from” `yourcompany.com` *actually* came from your “trusted” mail servers.

The “TruffleNet” TTP *weaponizes* this trust.

The attacker’s goal is to *send their phishing email* from one of your *trusted, authorized* servers. And what’s your most trusted, high-volume email sender? Your Amazon SES (Simple Email Service) instance. It’s *already* in your SPF and DKIM records.

An attacker doesn’t need to “spoof” your domain; they *use* your domain. When your Secure Email Gateway (SEG) or M365/Google filter receives the email, it performs its checks:

Check SPF: “Did this email come from an authorized IP?” -> PASS. (It came from Amazon’s IP, which is in your SPF record).
Check DKIM: “Is this email signed with a valid key?” -> PASS. (It was signed by Amazon SES, which is in your DKIM record).
Check DMARC: “Do SPF and DKIM align?” -> PASS.

Your entire email security stack sees a *perfectly valid, authenticated* email from `ceo@yourcompany.com` and delivers it *with a “trusted” flag* to your CFO’s inbox. This is a 100% bypass of all traditional email filters.

Phase 2: The “BEC 2.0” Kill Chain (From GitHub to Wire Fraud)

This is a CISO-level PostMortem because the kill chain is *devastatingly* simple and *invisible* to traditional tools.

Stage 1: Recon (The “Truffle Hunt”)

The attacker (a “Truffle Hunter”) uses automated scanners (like TruffleHog, git-secrets) to scan public GitHub repositories. They are looking for *leaked AWS API keys* (`AKIA…`). Your developer, in a “moment of weakness,” hardcoded a key into a script and pushed it to their *personal* public repo.

Stage 2: Initial Access (The “Leaked Key”)

The attacker finds the key. It’s a “low-privilege” dev key. But it has *one* critical permission: `ses:SendEmail`.

Stage 3: Internal Recon (The “Identity List”)

The attacker, now authenticated to your AWS account, runs `aws ses:ListIdentities`. This returns a list of *all email addresses and domains* your company has verified to send from (e.g., `ceo@yourcompany.com`, `finance@yourcompany.com`). The attacker now has their target list.

Stage 4: The Attack (The “Trusted” Phish)

The attacker uses this stolen, *valid* key to make a *valid* API call to `aws ses:SendEmail`.

From: `ceo@yourcompany.com`
To: `cfo@yourcompany.com`
Subject: URGENT: New Vendor Payment – Project Titan
Body: A *perfectly-crafted* AI-phish (a “Vibe Hack”) telling the CFO to wire $500k to a new bank account.

Stage 5: The Payout

The CFO receives the email. It passes *all* security checks. It *is* from the CEO (as far as the technology is concerned). They make the wire transfer. The corporate espionage or financial fraud is complete. You have *no idea* you’ve been breached.

Exploit Chain (Engineering)

This is a Cloud Misconfiguration and Credential Abuse TTP. The “exploit” is not a memory flaw; it’s a *logic* flaw in your Zero-Trust policy.

Trigger: `aws ses:SendEmail` or `aws ses:SendRawEmail` API call.
Precondition: A *leaked AWS API key* (e.g., `AKIA…`) with `ses:Send*` permissions, which was scanned from a public GitHub repo.
Sink (The Breach): Malicious, AI-generated “Vibe Hack” email delivered to C-suite.
Module/Build: `aws-sdk`, `boto3`, or direct HTTPS API calls from an attacker’s server.
Patch Delta: This is a *logic* flaw. The “fix” is an IAM policy `Condition` block to restrict *where* the API call can come from.

Reproduction & Lab Setup (Safe)

You can *and should* test this TTP in a *sandboxed* environment.

Harness: A sandboxed Alibaba Cloud or AWS account (NOT production).
Test: 1) Create a “dev” IAM user with *only* `ses:SendEmail` permissions. 2) *Verify* a sender email (`test@yourdomain.com`). 3) Go to an *external* VM (e.g., a TurboVPN endpoint) and configure the AWS CLI with those keys.
Execution: Run: `aws ses send-email –from “test@yourdomain.com” –to “your_test_inbox@gmail.com” –subject “TEST” –text “This is a test.”`
Result: The email will arrive, and it will *pass SPF/DKIM*. You have just proven the vulnerability.
Safety Note: NEVER use production keys. NEVER test this on your production environment. Use a *completely separate* domain and account.

Detection & Hunting Playbook

Your SOC (Security Operations Center) is blind to the *email*. It *must* be trained to hunt for the *API call*. This is the *new mandate*.

Telemetry: You *must* have AWS CloudTrail logs enabled and ingested into your SIEM.
Hunt Query #1 (The #1 IOC): “Show me *all* `ses:SendEmail` or `ses:SendRawEmail` events where the `sourceIPAddress` is *NOT* my known `[App_Server_IP_1]` OR `[App_Server_IP_2]`.” This is your P1 alert.
Hunt Query #2 (The Recon): “Show me *all* `ses:ListIdentities` or `iam:List*` calls from *anomalous IPs* or *user agents*.”
Hunt Query #3 (The Phish): “Show me *all* emails with `Subject: “Urgent Wire Transfer”`” (This is what our PhishRadar AI does automatically).

# Sigma Rule (Stub)
title: "TruffleNet" BEC TTP
status: experimental
description: "Detects AWS SES API calls from a non-whitelisted IP, indicating a possible hijacked key."
logsource:
  service: cloudtrail
detection:
  selection:
    eventName:
      - SendEmail
      - SendRawEmail
    eventSource: ses.amazonaws.com
  filter:
    not sourceIPAddress:
      - '1.2.3.4'  # Your App Server 1
      - '5.6.7.8'  # Your App Server 2
  condition: selection and filter

Mitigation & Hardening

This is a policy and hardening failure. This is the fix.

1. Scan & Revoke (Today): Run a secret-scanner (like TruffleHog) on *all* your public and private GitHub repos. *Revoke* any key you find.
2. Harden IAM (The *Real* Fix): This is your CISO mandate. Apply a *Condition* to your IAM policy. This policy *only* allows SES to be used from your *known, trusted* server IPs.{ “Version”: “2012-10-17”, “Statement”: [ { “Effect”: “Allow”, “Action”: “ses:SendEmail”, “Resource”: “*”, “Condition”: { “IpAddress”: { “aws:SourceIp”: [ “1.2.3.4/32”, // Your App Server 1 “5.6.7.8/32” // Your App Server 2 ] } } } ] }
3. Train Developers: *Mandate* Secure Coding Training. Teach them to *never* hardcode credentials. (See our Edureka partner link).

Patch Validation (Blue-Team)

Run this test (from your “Lab Setup”) *after* applying the IAM policy.
Run this from your *external* VPN’d VM:

# Test from an *external* IP
aws ses send-email --from "test@yourdomain.com" --to "your_test_inbox@gmail.com" --subject "TEST" --text "This is a test."

# EXPECTED RESULT:
An error occurred (AccessDenied) when calling the SendEmail operation...

If you get `AccessDenied`, your “Firewall Jail” is working. If the email *sends*, you are *still vulnerable*.

Blue-Team Checklist:

Scan *all* GitHub repos for `AKIA` keys *today*.
Apply IP-based `Condition` blocks to *all* critical IAM policies (especially SES, S3).
Set up CloudTrail log ingestion to your SIEM/MDR.
Create the “Hunt Query #1” (SES calls from non-whitelisted IPs) as a *P1 Alert* in your SOC.
Mandate Hardware Keys (FIDO2) for all AWS console users.

Recommended by CyberDudeBivash (Partner Links)

You need a layered defense. Here’s our vetted stack for this specific threat.

Kaspersky EDR
This is your *sensor*. It’s built to detect the *initial* infostealer that steals the keys from your developer’s laptop.Edureka — AWS Security Training
This is a *developer* failure. Train your devs *now* on Secure Coding and IAM Policy Management.Alibaba Cloud (VPC/SEG)
This is *how* you build the “Firewall Jails” (Network Segmentation) for your cloud infrastructure.

AliExpress (Hardware Keys)
*Mandate* this for all AWS Admins. Get FIDO2/YubiKey-compatible keys. This stops the *console* session hijack.TurboVPN
Your developers are remote. You *must* secure their connection to your internal network.Rewardful
Run a bug bounty program. Pay white-hats to find flaws *before* APTs do.

CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps

We don’t just report on these threats. We hunt them. We are the “human-in-the-loop” that your automated defenses are missing.

Managed Detection & Response (MDR): This is the *solution*. Our 24/7 SOC team becomes your Threat Hunters, watching your *CloudTrail logs* for these *exact* “anomalous SES” TTPs.
Adversary Simulation (Red Team): This is the *proof*. We will *simulate* this “TruffleNet” TTP to *prove* your IAM policies and detection are working.
PhishRadar AI — This is the *only* tool that can stop the “Vibe Hacking” BEC email *even if* it comes from your “trusted” SES. It analyzes *intent*, not just headers.
SessionShield — Protects your AWS *console* sessions from being hijacked by the *same* stolen key.
Emergency Incident Response (IR): You see this TTP? Call us. Our 24/7 team will hunt the attacker and eradicate them.

Explore 24/7 MDR Services Book an Adversary Simulation (Red Team)Subscribe to ThreatWire

FAQ

Q: What is BEC (Business Email Compromise)?
A: A “social engineering” attack where an attacker impersonates a C-level executive (like the CEO) to trick an employee (like the CFO) into performing a fraudulent wire transfer.

Q: What is Amazon SES?
A: Simple Email Service. It’s an AWS “cloud email” platform that apps use to send millions of transactional emails (like “password reset” or “order confirmation”). Attackers love it because it’s *whitelisted* by all security filters.

Q: Why does DMARC/SPF/DKIM fail to stop this?
A: Because they are *working perfectly*. DMARC/SPF are designed to verify that an email *from* your domain *originated* from your authorized servers. In this attack, it *is* originating from your authorized server (Amazon SES). This TTP *bypasses* this entire layer of defense.

Q: What’s the #1 action to take *today*?
A: Harden your IAM policy. Go to your Amazon SES IAM policy *right now* and add a *Condition* to restrict `ses:SendEmail` to *only* your trusted application server IPs. (See “Harden” section above). This *instantly* kills this TTP.

Timeline & Credits

This “TruffleNet” TTP is an active, ongoing campaign.
Credit: This analysis is based on active Incident Response engagements and TTPs seen in the wild by the CyberDudeBivash threat hunting team.

References

Affiliate Disclosure: We may earn commissions from partner links at no extra cost to you. These are tools we use and trust. Opinions are independent.

CyberDudeBivash — Global Cybersecurity Apps, Services & Threat Intelligence.

cyberdudebivash.com · cyberbivash.blogspot.com · cryptobivash.code.blog

#BEC #BusinessEmailCompromise #AWS #AmazonSES #DMARC #SPF #CyberDudeBivash #IncidentResponse #MDR #ThreatHunting #CloudSecurity #IAM #TruffleNet

Cyberdudebivash

“TruffleNet” BEC Attack Uses Your Own AWS Account to Steal Your Money.

CISO Briefing: The “TruffleNet” BEC Attack Uses Your Own AWS Account to Steal Your Money. (Your SEG is Blind) — by CyberDudeBivash

Phase 1: The “TruffleNet” TTP (Why Your SEG is Obsolete)

Phase 2: The “BEC 2.0” Kill Chain (From GitHub to Wire Fraud)

Stage 1: Recon (The “Truffle Hunt”)

Stage 2: Initial Access (The “Leaked Key”)

Stage 3: Internal Recon (The “Identity List”)

Stage 4: The Attack (The “Trusted” Phish)

Stage 5: The Payout

Exploit Chain (Engineering)

Reproduction & Lab Setup (Safe)

Detection & Hunting Playbook

Mitigation & Hardening

Patch Validation (Blue-Team)

Recommended by CyberDudeBivash (Partner Links)

CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps

FAQ

Timeline & Credits

References

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“TruffleNet” BEC Attack Uses Your Own AWS Account to Steal Your Money.

CISO Briefing: The “TruffleNet” BEC Attack Uses Your *Own AWS Account* to Steal Your Money. (Your SEG is Blind) — by CyberDudeBivash

Phase 1: The “TruffleNet” TTP (Why Your SEG is Obsolete)

Phase 2: The “BEC 2.0” Kill Chain (From GitHub to Wire Fraud)

Stage 1: Recon (The “Truffle Hunt”)

Stage 2: Initial Access (The “Leaked Key”)

Stage 3: Internal Recon (The “Identity List”)

Stage 4: The Attack (The “Trusted” Phish)

Stage 5: The Payout

Exploit Chain (Engineering)

Reproduction & Lab Setup (Safe)

Detection & Hunting Playbook

Mitigation & Hardening

Patch Validation (Blue-Team)

Recommended by CyberDudeBivash (Partner Links)

CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps

FAQ

Timeline & Credits

References

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CISO Briefing: The “TruffleNet” BEC Attack Uses Your Own AWS Account to Steal Your Money. (Your SEG is Blind) — by CyberDudeBivash