
Author: CyberDudeBivash
Powered by: CyberDudeBivash Brand | cyberdudebivash.com
Related:cyberbivash.blogspot.com
Daily Threat Intel by CyberDudeBivash
Zero-days, exploit breakdowns, IOCs, detection rules & mitigation playbooks.
Follow on LinkedInApps & Security ToolsAuthor: CyberDudeBivash
Powered by: CyberDudeBivash Brand | cyberdudebivash.com
Related:cyberbivash.blogspot.com
CISO Briefing: The “Weaponized Video” Attack. How Hackers Trick Your Staff Into Hacking Themselves. (An EDR Bypass PostMortem) — by CyberDudeBivash
By CyberDudeBivash · 01 Nov 2025 · cyberdudebivash.com · Intel on cyberbivash.blogspot.com
LinkedIn: ThreatWirecryptobivash.code.blog
FILELESS MALWARE • SOCIAL ENGINEERING • EDR BYPASS • VIBE HACKING
Situation: This is a CISO-level “red alert”. A new “Vibe Hacking” TTP is bypassing your EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response). Attackers send a “weaponized video” (a `.ZIP` with a `.LNK` or `.JS` file) that “fails to play.” It presents a *fake “Missing Codec” error* and tricks your user into *manually running* a fileless PowerShell command to “fix it.”
This is a decision-grade CISO brief. This is not a “technical” exploit. It’s a *psychological* exploit of your *trusted* employees and your *trusted* EDR whitelists. Your EDR is *blind* because it sees a *human user* manually running `powershell.exe`—the *exact* behavior of a “trusted sysadmin.” This is the new kill chain for ransomware.
TL;DR — Attackers are tricking users into *manually running* fileless malware.
- The TTP: Fake “video.mp4.js” file → “Missing Codec” error → Tricks user to *paste* `powershell.exe -e …` into a terminal.
- The “EDR Bypass”: Your EDR *trusts* a human user *manually* running PowerShell. It logs this as “benign admin activity” and *misses the breach*.
- The Impact: Fileless C2 Beacon → Infostealer → Session Hijacking (MFA Bypass) → Ransomware.
- THE ACTION (CISO): 1) HARDEN: *De-weaponize `.JS` files*. Change the default handler from `wscript.exe` to `notepad.exe` via GPO. 2) HUNT: This is the mandate. Hunt for `powershell.exe` with encoded (`-e`) commands *now*.
TTP Factbox: “Weaponized Video” (Gootloader)
| TTP | Component | Severity | Exploitability | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Social Engineering (T1566) | `.JS` / `.LNK` in `.ZIP` | Critical | SEG Bypass | PhishRadar AI / GPO Hardening |
| Fileless Malware (T1059.001) | `powershell.exe -e …` | Critical | EDR Bypass (LotL) | MDR (Threat Hunting) |
Fileless BackdoorEDR Bypass TTPSocial EngineeringContents
- Phase 1: The “Vibe Hack” (Why This TTP Bypasses Your EDR)
- Phase 2: The “Fileless” Kill Chain (From “Click” to “C2”)
- Exploit Chain (Engineering)
- Reproduction & Lab Setup (Safe)
- Detection & Hunting Playbook (The *New* SOC Mandate)
- Mitigation & Hardening (The CISO Mandate)
- Audit Validation (Blue-Team)
- Tools We Recommend (Partner Links)
- CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps
- FAQ
- Timeline & Credits
- References
Phase 1: The “Vibe Hack” (Why This TTP Bypasses Your EDR)
As a CISO, you’ve spent millions on a “Next-Gen” EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) stack. Your vendor promised “AI-powered protection.” Yet, this attack bypasses it completely. Why?
It’s because this attack *never uses a “virus”*. It’s a “Living off the Land” (LotL) attack that exploits your EDR’s *trust* in your *user*.
1. The “Social Engineering” (The Lure)
Your Secure Email Gateway (SEG) is useless. The attack doesn’t *start* with an email. It starts with your employee Googling a “benign” term: “sample rental agreement template.”
The Gootloader gang *poisons* Google’s search results to make their *malicious website* (a fake forum) rank #1.
2. The “EDR Bypass” (The “Trusted Process”)
The user, *trusting Google*, clicks the link. The fake forum says “Click here to download your document.” It delivers a `.ZIP` file containing `video_proposal.mp4.js`.
Your employee, *not seeing the `.js` extension* (because Windows hides it by default), double-clicks.
This *doesn’t* run malware. It runs `wscript.exe` (a *trusted* Microsoft tool) which *pops up a fake error*:
`”VIDEO_CODEC_ERROR: Your PC is missing the ‘VX-14’ codec. Please run the following command in PowerShell to install it.”`
`powershell.exe -e JABj…[long_base64_string]…`
Your user, *wanting to do their job*, copies this “safe” text and *manually pastes it* into a PowerShell window.
Your EDR is *100% blind*. It sees `explorer.exe` (User) → `powershell.exe` (Manual Run). This is *identical* to a SysAdmin’s behavior. It is *whitelisted* and logged as “benign noise.”
Phase 2: The “Fileless” Kill Chain (From “Click” to “C2”)
This is the full ransomware and espionage kill chain that our Incident Response (IR) teams are seeing in the wild.
Stage 1: Initial Access (The Google Search)
Your employee, `user@yourcompany.com`, clicks a poisoned Google search result.
Stage 2: Execution (The “.JS” Click & “Self-Hack”)
The user opens `document.zip`, clicks `document.pdf.js`, and is *tricked* into *manually running* the `powershell.exe -e …` command.
Stage 3: C2 & Persistence (The “EndClient” Backdoor)
The fileless PowerShell script (the “Gootloader” payload) does two things:
- C2 Beacon: It makes an *outbound HTTPS connection* to an attacker-controlled server (a “C2 beacon”), often using DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) to bypass firewalls.
- Persistence: It creates a new `Scheduled Task` or `Registry Run Key` to *re-launch* this same fileless script every time the user logs in.
The attacker now has a *persistent backdoor* on your employee’s machine. The breach is complete.
Stage 4: Post-Exploitation (The “Breach”)
The attacker uses this backdoor to:
- Run Mimikatz *in-memory* to steal credentials.
- Steal *all* browser session cookies (Session Hijacking) to bypass MFA.
- Move laterally to your file servers and Domain Controller.
- Exfiltrate your “4TB” of CUI, PII, and IP.
- Deploy Ransomware.
Exploit Chain (Engineering)
This is a “Trusted Process” Hijack (T1219/T1059). The “exploit” is a *logic* flaw in your EDR Whitelisting policy.
- Trigger: User double-clicks `.js` file or `.lnk` file.
- Precondition: EDR/AV is configured to *automatically trust* all `wscript.exe` / `cscript.exe` / `powershell.exe` processes. Windows “Hides known file extensions” is ON.
- Sink (The RCE): `explorer.exe` → `wscript.exe file.js` (Fake Error) → `user` *pastes* → `powershell.exe -e …` (Fileless C2)
- Module/Build: `wscript.exe` (Trusted), `powershell.exe` (Trusted).
- Patch Delta: There is no “patch.” The “fix” is GPO Hardening (changing the default `.js` handler) and MDR (Threat Hunting).
Reproduction & Lab Setup (Safe)
You *must* test your EDR’s visibility for this TTP.
- Harness/Target: A sandboxed Windows 11 VM with your standard EDR agent installed.
- Test: 1) Create a file named `test.js`. 2) Put this *one line* of code in it: `WScript.CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).Run(“calc.exe”);`
- Execution: Double-click the `test.js` file.
- Result: Did `calc.exe` launch? Did your EDR fire a P1 (Critical) alert for `wscript.exe -> calc.exe`? If it was *silent*, your EDR is *blind* to this TTP.
- Safety Note: If `calc.exe` can run, so can the “EndClient” RAT.
Detection & Hunting Playbook (The *New* SOC Mandate)
Your SOC *must* hunt for this. Your SIEM/EDR is blind to the exploit itself; it can *only* see the *result*. This is your playbook.
- Hunt TTP 1 (The #1 IOC): “Anomalous Child Process.” This is your P1 alert. Your `wscript.exe` process should *NEVER* spawn a shell (`powershell.exe`, `cmd.exe`, `/bin/bash`).# EDR / SIEM Hunt Query (Pseudocode) SELECT * FROM process_events WHERE (parent_process_name = ‘wscript.exe’ OR parent_process_name = ‘cscript.exe’) AND (process_name = ‘powershell.exe’ OR process_name = ‘cmd.exe’)
- Hunt TTP 2 (The C2): “Show me all *network connections* from `wscript.exe` or `cscript.exe` to a *newly-registered domain* or *anomalous IP*.”
- Hunt TTP 3 (The Persistence): “Show me *all new* Scheduled Tasks or Registry Run Keys that contain `wscript.exe` or `cscript.exe`.”
Mitigation & Hardening (The CISO Mandate)
This is a Windows Configuration failure. This is the fix.
- 1. HARDEN (The *Real* Fix): This is your CISO mandate. De-weaponize JavaScript files.
You must *change the default file handler* for `.JS` files. An employee should *never* “execute” a `.JS` file. It should *open* in Notepad.
The Fix: Use GPO to change the default handler for `.js` files from `wscript.exe` (Execute) to `notepad.exe` (View). This *kills* the TTP. - 2. HUNT (The “MDR” Fix): You *cannot* run a 9-to-5 SOC. You *must* have a 24/7 human-led MDR team (like ours) to hunt for the *behavioral* TTPs (like Hunt TTP 1) that your EDR will log but *not* alert on.
- 3. VERIFY (The “Red Team” Fix): You *must* run an Adversary Simulation (Red Team) to *prove* your EDR and your SOC team *can* detect this TTP.
Audit Validation (Blue-Team)
Run this *today*. This is not a “patch”; it’s an *audit*.
# 1. Audit your EDR (The "Lab" Test) # Run the "Lab Setup" test (`test.js -> calc.exe`). # Did your EDR *see* it? If not, it is BLIND. # 2. Audit your File Handlers # (Run `ftype JScript.file`) # Does it say "wscript.exe"? If yes, you are VULNERABLE. # Run the GPO to change it to "notepad.exe". # 3. Run the "Lab Test" again # Did `calc.exe` launch? Or did `notepad.exe` open? # If Notepad opened, you have *successfully* hardened your fleet.
Is Your EDR Blind to “Fileless” Attacks?
Your SOC is slow. Your EDR is whitelisted. CyberDudeBivash is the leader in Ransomware Defense. We are offering a Free 30-Minute Ransomware Readiness Assessment to show you the *exact* gaps in your “LotL” and “Fileless” defenses.
Book Your FREE 30-Min Assessment Now →
Recommended by CyberDudeBivash (Partner Links)
You need a layered defense. Here’s our vetted stack for this specific threat.
Kaspersky EDR
This is your *sensor*. It’s the #1 tool for providing the behavioral telemetry (process chains, network data) that your *human* MDR team needs to hunt.Edureka — Threat Hunting Training
Your SOC team can’t find what they don’t know. Train them *now* on PowerShell Threat Hunting and LotL TTPs.TurboVPN
The phish often lands on a *remote* device on *public Wi-Fi*. A VPN encrypts this initial access channel.
Alibaba Cloud (VDI)
A key mitigation. Use Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI). If the VDI is popped, you *burn it* and re-image in seconds. The host is safe.AliExpress (Hardware Keys)
*Mandate* this for all Domain Admins. Get FIDO2/YubiKey-compatible keys. They stop the *initial phish* from succeeding.Rewardful
Run a bug bounty program. Pay white-hats to find flaws *before* APTs do.
CyberDudeBivash Services & Apps
We don’t just report on these threats. We hunt them. We are the “human-in-the-loop” that your automated EDR is missing.
- Managed Detection & Response (MDR): This is the *solution*. Our 24/7 SOC team becomes your Threat Hunters, watching your EDR logs for these *exact* “wscript -> powershell” TTPs.
- Adversary Simulation (Red Team): This is the *proof*. We will *simulate* this exact “Fileless” Gootloader kill chain to show you where you are blind.
- Emergency Incident Response (IR): You found this TTP? Call us. Our 24/7 team will hunt the attacker and eradicate them.
- PhishRadar AI — Stops the phishing attacks that *initiate* the breach.
- SessionShield — Protects your *admin sessions* from the *credential theft* that happens after this breach.
Book Your FREE 30-Min AssessmentExplore 24/7 MDR ServicesSubscribe to ThreatWire
FAQ
Q: What is a “Weaponized Video” attack?
A: It’s a social engineering TTP. The attacker sends a `.ZIP` file containing a `.JS` or `.LNK` file *disguised* as a video (`video.mp4.js`). When clicked, it shows a *fake* “Missing Codec” error and *tricks* the user into *copy-pasting* a malicious PowerShell command into their terminal, “hacking” themselves.
Q: What is “Fileless Malware”?
A: It’s a type of malicious software that runs *entirely in memory (RAM)*. It never writes a “malware.exe” file to the hard drive. Because most antivirus (AV) is built to *scan files*, this attack is invisible to them.
Q: Why does my EDR/Antivirus miss this attack?
A: Because your EDR is *configured to trust* `wscript.exe` and `powershell.exe`. This is a “Trusted Process” bypass. The EDR sees a ‘trusted’ Microsoft process running and *ignores* it. You *must* have a *human* MDR team hunting for the *behavioral* anomalies.
Q: What is the #1 action to take *today*?
A: HARDEN. Go to your Group Policy (GPO) and *change the default file handler* for `.JS` and `.VBS` files from `wscript.exe` (Execute) to `notepad.exe` (View). This *de-weaponizes* the TTP instantly. Your *second* action is to call our team to run an emergency Threat Hunt for this TTP.
Timeline & Credits
This “Gootloader/LNK-in-ZIP” TTP (T1566.001 / T1059) is an active, ongoing campaign by multiple APTs and RaaS groups.
Credit: This analysis is based on active Incident Response engagements by the CyberDudeBivash threat hunting team.
References
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1059.007 (JavaScript)
- MITRE ATT&CK: T1059.001 (PowerShell)
- CyberDudeBivash MDR Service
Affiliate Disclosure: We may earn commissions from partner links at no extra cost to you. These are tools we use and trust. Opinions are independent.
CyberDudeBivash — Global Cybersecurity Apps, Services & Threat Intelligence.
cyberdudebivash.com · cyberbivash.blogspot.com · cryptobivash.code.blog
#SocialEngineering #VibeHacking #Gootloader #LNKexploit #ZIP #FilelessMalware #PowerShell #EDRBypass #Ransomware #CyberDudeBivash #IncidentResponse #MDR #ThreatHunting #LotL
Leave a comment