Author: CyberDudeBivash
Powered by: CyberDudeBivash Brand | cyberdudebivash.com
Related:cyberbivash.blogspot.com

Daily Threat Intel by CyberDudeBivash
Zero-days, exploit breakdowns, IOCs, detection rules & mitigation playbooks.

Follow on LinkedIn Apps & Security Tools

CyberDudeBivash Incident / Exploit Deep-Dive · High-Severity Software Supply Chain Alert

OPEN-SOURCE IS BROKEN: 43,000 Hidden Malware Packages Rotted in npm for TWO YEARS-You Are Exposed

By CyberDudeBivash (Bivash Kumar Nayak) · Published by CyberDudeBivash Pvt Ltd ·

Ecosystem: cyberdudebivash.com · cyberbivash.blogspot.com · cyberdudebivash-news.blogspot.com · cryptobivash.code.blog

CyberDudeBivash Emergency Briefing · npm Ecosystem · Supply Chain Integrity

A worm-like spam campaign dumped over 43,000+ malicious and junk packages into the npm registry over nearly two years, silently polluting the open-source ecosystem and exposing organizations that blindly trust public registries in their CI/CD pipelines.

This is not just about “spam packages.” It’s a structural failure that shows how easily attackers can weaponize your build systems, dev environments, and software supply chain.

TL;DR – What You Need to Know in 60 Seconds

Over 43,000 spam / malicious npm packages (dubbed the “IndonesianFoods worm”) were published across at least 11 npm accounts over almost two years without being removed.
The campaign abused automation to flood the registry with junk packages, some with worm-like behavior that auto-generated more packages and removed safety flags.
While many packages looked like “harmless spam,” the technique opens the door for future payload swaps, supply-chain backdoors, and registry pollution at scale.
If your organization:
- Uses npm in CI/CD pipelines,
- Relies on wildcards like ^ and ~, or
- Builds containers with unvetted dependencies,
you must assume your environment has already processed or cached some of these packages.
You need an immediate plan to:
- Audit your dependency trees and lockfiles,
- Scan build artifacts and logs,
- Implement private registries, SBOM controls and execution policies,
- And strengthen detection around npm usage in dev and CI environments.
This guide provides: technical deep-dive, triage steps, detection ideas, SBOM-based mitigation, and a 30-60-90 day plan from CyberDudeBivash.

Above-the-Fold Partner Picks for npm / Supply Chain Defense

A quick, transparent note: some links below are affiliate links. If you purchase through them, CyberDudeBivash may earn a commission at no extra cost to you. We only recommend tools that make sense in a real software supply chain defense strategy.

Kaspersky – Endpoint & EDR to monitor suspicious Node.js and build server behavior. Get Kaspersky EDR →
Edureka – DevSecOps / Cloud security training for developers and DevOps who manage npm-heavy stacks. View DevSecOps Courses →
AliExpress – FIDO2 hardware tokens for developer / maintainer accounts (GitHub, npm, CI control panels). Shop Security Keys →
Alibaba Cloud – Isolated build infrastructure and segmented VPCs for safer CI/CD. Explore Alibaba Cloud →
TurboVPN – Encrypted tunnels for admins and SREs accessing build servers and registries. Secure Access with TurboVPN →

Author’s Note (from Bivash, Founder of CyberDudeBivash)
I’ve reviewed enough npm incidents in the last few years to say this with confidence: if your organization still treats open-source registries as “trusted by default,” you are already behind the attackers. This is not a blog post written for clicks – it’s a field note turned into a blueprint for your security, engineering, and DevOps teams.

1. Incident Snapshot: What Happened in npm?

Security researchers recently uncovered a coordinated spam and potential malware campaign inside the npm ecosystem, now referred to as the IndonesianFoods worm. Over a period of almost two years, attackers systematically published more than 43,000 fake or junk packages across at least 11 npm accounts. Many of these packages followed a specific naming pattern based on Indonesian names and food terms, with auto-generated suffixes and numbers.

In simple words: an automated worm-like script repeatedly created and published new npm packages at scale, turning the registry itself into a playground for attackers.

While early analysis shows that many of these packages behaved like spam and registry pollution (rather than immediate credential-stealing malware), that is exactly what makes this campaign so dangerous:

It proves that it is possible to pollute over 1% of the npm ecosystem with junk and potentially weaponizable packages.
It shows that large-scale automated publishing can go unnoticed for years.
It opens the door for a “silent swap” – where junk packages later receive real malicious updates.

2. Why 43,000 “Spam” Packages Are Not Just Spam

You might be thinking: “If these packages are mostly spam, why should I care? We do not depend on Indonesian food packages in production.”

That mindset is exactly how attackers win.

Open-source ecosystems like npm are graph-driven. When you install one dependency, you often pull in:

10–50 transitive dependencies in small projects,
Sometimes 500+ in larger applications and monorepos,
And in CI/CD, these dependencies may be fetched for multiple microservices, jobs, and build stages.

If attackers can flood the ecosystem with believable package names and structures, they create several new attack paths:

Typosquatting and confusion – Junk packages that look similar to real ones can be renamed or updated to include real malicious payloads later.
Noise as a cover – Flooding the registry with thousands of junk artifacts makes it harder for scanning tools, maintainers, and defenders to focus on genuinely dangerous packages.
Future access to TEA-like token reward systems – Some campaigns appear to target decentralized reward protocols for open-source contributions, turning “spam” into an economic weapon.
Attack rehearsal – If attackers can get 43,000 packages into npm and keep them there for two years, they can run similar operations with more destructive payloads next time.

3. Inside the IndonesianFoods Worm: How It Polluted npm

The campaign earned the name “IndonesianFoods worm” because of the way it generated package names. The underlying script reportedly used two internal dictionaries:

One list of Indonesian personal names (for example, andi, budi, cindy, zul)
One list of Indonesian food items (for example, rendang, sate, bakso, tapai)

The script would randomly pick one name and one food, add a random number, and sometimes append a suffix like “-kyuki” or “-breki”. Each combination produced a new package, which the worm then published under one of the attacker-controlled npm accounts.

Key characteristics of this worm-like behavior include:

Automated package generation – The script continuously produced new package names and folder structures.
High publication rate – In some observations, a single script run could push dozens of packages per minute.
Multiple attacker accounts – At least 11 distinct npm accounts were used to spread the load and avoid easy disabling.
Junk / duplicate content – Many packages masqueraded as Next.js boilerplates or generic projects with minimal customization.

That combination produced thousands of suspicious but individually boring packages. At scale, however, they changed the shape of the ecosystem.

Mini Scenario: The “Harmless” Sandbox that Leaked into Production

Imagine a junior developer exploring npm for sample Next.js templates. They stumble upon a package that looks like a starter kit with a random but harmless-sounding name.

They install it locally, test a few concepts, and later reuse parts of that code in an internal app. Months later, another team reuses those internal components in a production microservice.

If attackers ever push a real payload into that package line-or another package in the same dependency chain-you now have a hidden trust anchor in your production stack, inherited from a random dev experiment.

4. Blast Radius: Who Is Actually at Risk?

Not every reader of this post is equally exposed, but almost every modern software team is affected in some way.

4.1 Startups and SaaS Teams

Startups often:

Move fast with little dependency governance.
Use Node.js for frontends, backends, and internal tooling.
Let engineers freely install npm packages during rapid prototyping.

For you, the risk is silent persistence:

Suspicious packages might sit inside private repos, Docker images, or lockfiles.
Future updates or swaps could suddenly weaponize long-forgotten dependencies.

4.2 Enterprises with Complex CI/CD Pipelines

Enterprises:

Rely heavily on automation and CI/CD.
Have long-lived build agents with cached dependencies.
Use shared artifact repositories and internal npm mirrors.

For you, the risk is ecosystem poisoning:

Once a junk or malicious package enters an internal mirror, it may live there for years.
Multiple teams may unknowingly reuse polluted templates and boilerplates.

4.3 Security Vendors and Tool Builders

If you build security tools, agent software, or developer tooling using Node.js, the stakes are even higher. An attacker-controlled dependency inside your software can:

Compromise your customers directly.
Damage your brand and legal position.
Turn your security product into an attack avenue.

Free 30-Min npm Supply Chain & CI/CD Risk Assessment

Not sure whether this campaign touched your org? In a free 30-minute session, CyberDudeBivash will:

Review your npm usage patterns in CI/CD and developer environments.
Identify high-risk dependency behaviors (wildcards, direct registry access, unpinned builds).
Outline a practical 30-60-90 day supply chain hardening plan tailored to your stack.

Book Your FREE 30-Min Assessment Now

5. Immediate Triage: How to Check If You’re Exposed

Before we talk about long-term architecture, let’s start with a realistic question: “What should we do this week?”

Here is a practical triage checklist you can use with your DevSecOps and engineering teams.

5.1 Inventory npm Use Across Your Organization

Start by mapping where npm lives in your environment:

Frontend apps (React, Vue, Next.js, Angular)
Backend services built on Node.js
Internal tools and CLIs written in JavaScript/TypeScript
CI/CD pipelines using npm for build steps
Shared Docker images with npm installed

5.2 Search Your Lockfiles and Manifests

Look into:

package.json and package-lock.json
yarn.lock and pnpm-lock.yaml
Any custom dependency configuration files

You can run simple text searches to detect suspicious patterns such as:

Random-looking package names that do not match your internal dependency guidelines.
Dependencies without clear justification in your architecture.

5.3 Check Internal npm Mirrors and Caches

If you use:

Artifactory, Nexus, Verdaccio, or similar local registries,
Or caching proxies for npm,

you should:

Query for packages matching the Indonesian-style naming scheme.
Check for abnormal growth in npm artifact counts over the last two years.
Flag any unreviewed packages that are present in your private mirrors.

5.4 Scan Build Logs for Suspicious npm Activity

Look for:

Build jobs that pull unexpected npm dependencies.
Unusual spikes in npm install durations.
New or unfamiliar node modules being pulled in bulk.

Combine this with EDR telemetry on your build servers to see whether:

node or npm spawned unusual child processes.
Any build processes reached out to unknown external domains or IP addresses.

6. Detection & Hunting: What to Look for in Logs, EDR, and CI

Even if this specific campaign was more about registry pollution than active, destructive malware, your detection strategy should assume that: future variants will not be so “polite.”

6.1 EDR / XDR Hunting Ideas

On build servers and developer endpoints:

Hunt for long chains like npm.exe → node.exe → powershell.exe or node → bash → curl.
Flag Node.js processes that:
- Write to sensitive directories (SSH keys, cloud config directories).
- Spawn scripting interpreters unexpectedly.
- Open outbound connections to hosts not in your allowlist.
Score suspicious behavior higher when it happens on CI/CD runners instead of user laptops.

6.2 SIEM / Log Queries Around npm

In your SIEM (Splunk, Sentinel, Elastic, etc.), build queries around:

Unusual npm install patterns-sudden bursts of installations outside normal deployment windows.
New npm users or tokens being used from unusual IP ranges.
Repeated install attempts from a single script or template project.

6.3 SBOM-Based Scanning

If you already generate SBOMs (Software Bill of Materials) for your builds using tools like Syft, CycloneDX, or Trivy:

Search for suspicious, non-standard package names.
Alert on dependencies that appeared newly in the last 6–12 months without a clear business justification.
Mark npm dependencies with unknown maintainers for manual review.

7. Mitigations: Short-Term Fixes and Structural Changes

There is no single magic product that will “fix npm.” You need a layered approach controlled by policy, tooling, and culture.

7.1 Stop Treating Public npm as Trusted-by-Default

Use private registries as the default source for builds; mirror only reviewed packages from npm.
Implement allowlists of approved packages and maintainers.
Block direct access to public npm from production CI/CD where possible.

7.2 Pin Versions and Avoid Reckless Wildcards

Version wildcards like ^ and ~ make dependency resolution unpredictable, which attackers love.

Use fixed versions in production-critical services.
If you must use ranges, restrict them tightly and review updates via pull requests.
Lock down updates through a change management process, not blind “npm update” runs in CI.

7.3 Enforce Strong Authentication and Isolation

Require MFA and hardware tokens for GitHub, npm, and CI/CD admin accounts.
Segment build infrastructure from general-purpose workloads.
Ensure build workers have the minimum privileges needed to do their job.

7.4 Integrate Supply Chain Scanners

Use tools that can:

Detect suspicious post-install scripts.
Flag abnormal dependency graphs.
Cross-check maintainers, metadata, and known-risk indicators.

Combine open-source scanners with commercial platforms where your risk exposure justifies it.

8. CyberDudeBivash 30-60-90 Day npm & Supply Chain Hardening Plan

Use this as a practical roadmap you can drop directly into your security program.

Next 30 Days – Stabilize and Get Visibility

Inventory all npm usage (apps, tools, CI/CD, containers).
Generate SBOMs for your most critical services.
Scan lockfiles and internal registries for suspicious packages.
Ensure EDR coverage on build servers and developer workstations.
Roll out basic npm usage guidelines for developers.

Next 60 Days – Control and Contain

Introduce private npm registries as the default.
Implement a minimal allowlist of approved packages and versions.
Integrate supply chain scanning into CI/CD pipelines.
Harden CI workers (network controls, secrets management, logging).
Run internal threat hunting focused on npm-related anomalies.

Next 90 Days – Automate and Mature

Automate dependency review workflows with pull-request gates.
Standardize SBOM generation and storage across all services.
Define a formal open-source governance policy with clear owners.
Conduct a dedicated supply chain incident simulation with security, DevOps, and engineering.
Measure and track key metrics: new dependencies per release, external package risk score, time-to-remediate.

9. How CyberDudeBivash Can Help Your Team

At CyberDudeBivash, we live at the intersection of threat intelligence, automation, and practical DevSecOps. We don’t just publish blog posts; we work with teams to translate incidents like this into real improvements in their pipelines.

Software Supply Chain Risk Assessments – npm, PyPI, container registries, internal artifact mirrors.
CI/CD and DevSecOps Hardening – from GitHub Actions to Jenkins, GitLab CI, and cloud-native pipelines.
Custom Detection Engineering – rules focused specifically on build server and developer endpoint behavior.
Developer Training – secure dependency management, package hygiene, and incident-ready engineering culture.

Talk to CyberDudeBivash About Your Supply Chain Risk →

10. CyberDudeBivash Recommended Defense Stack (Real-World Use Cases)

Below are partner tools that align with the risk model in this incident. Use them as part of a layered strategy – not as “silver bullets”.

Kaspersky – Endpoint & EDR for Build Servers

Deploy behavioral EDR on build servers and developer endpoints to catch unusual Node.js, npm, and script behavior, especially where it chains into PowerShell or shell interpreters.

Get Kaspersky EDR →

AliExpress – FIDO2 Hardware Security Keys

Use FIDO2 keys for GitHub, npm maintainer accounts, and CI/CD admin panels so that stolen credentials from poisoned packages cannot be reused easily.

Shop Security Keys on AliExpress →

Edureka – DevSecOps & Cloud Security Training

Upskill your developers and SREs to understand supply chain attacks, npm risks, and secure CI/CD patterns, not just “how to write code”.

Explore DevSecOps Courses →

Alibaba Cloud – Segmented Build Infrastructure

Run your CI/CD runners and artifact registries in tightly segmented VPCs to contain any compromise from malicious dependencies.

Deploy Secure Build Environments →

TurboVPN – Secure Remote Access for Engineers

Ensure your developers and admins access Git, CI/CD dashboards, and registries over encrypted tunnels, reducing exposure of credentials over the internet.

Get TurboVPN →

Rewardful – Incentivize Secure Contributions

Use Rewardful to create private bug bounty or partner reward programs so you can pay contributors for finding dependency risks before attackers do.

Launch a Private Bug Bounty →

Affiliate Disclosure: Some links above are affiliate links. If you purchase through them, CyberDudeBivash may earn a commission at no extra cost to you.

11. CyberDudeBivash Apps & Products for Supply Chain Defense

Beyond blog posts, CyberDudeBivash builds practical tools and apps for defenders, DevOps teams, and engineers.

SessionShield – Detects and reacts to suspicious session usage (GitHub, cloud consoles, npm maintainers) after a build or endpoint compromise.
Cephalus Hunter – RDP and ransomware exposure scanner to check for lateral movement paths, often abused after a supply chain foothold.
Wazuh Ransomware Rules (Windows & Linux) – Detection rules that complement npm incident monitoring with behavior-based ransomware alerts.

Explore CyberDudeBivash Apps & Products →

Free PDF: npm Supply Chain Incident Response Checklist

I’ve prepared a one-page incident response checklist you can share with your engineering and security leads today. It covers:

Key questions to ask about npm usage in your org.
Immediate triage tasks for developers and DevSecOps.
Signals to look for in logs, EDR, and CI pipelines.
A simple 30-60-90 day structure to drive change.

Get the PDF by joining the CyberDudeBivash ThreatWire newsletter. No spam, just high-signal incident briefings and practical defense playbooks.

Get the npm Incident Checklist & Join ThreatWire →

12. FAQ: Questions Your CISO, CTO, and Developers Will Ask

Q1. If this campaign was mostly “spam,” why is everyone so worried?

Because scale and duration matter. If an attacker can keep more than 43,000 junk packages in a critical ecosystem for almost two years, they’ve proved that:

The registry’s defenses are not tuned for spam at this scale.
Future variants could quietly flip from junk to active malware.
Defenders are still underestimating ecosystem-level manipulation.

Q2. How do we know whether any of our projects pulled these packages?

You may not know with certainty unless you:

Scan your SBOMs and lockfiles for suspicious names.
Review logs from build systems and internal registries.
Check for the specific naming patterns associated with this worm.

The point is not only to detect these exact packages, but to tighten your process so similar campaigns fail next time.

Q3. Should we block npm entirely in CI/CD?

For most organizations, the better approach is:

Use a private mirror as the source of truth.
Replicate only vetted packages from public npm.
Apply governance, scanning, and approvals at the mirror level.

Q4. Is this incident related to other npm malware campaigns?

It sits in the broader pattern of npm being heavily targeted, from typosquatting attacks to packages that steal credentials or run malicious post-install scripts. Even if each campaign has a different motive-spam, financial gain, espionage-they all leverage the same fundamental truth: we depend on open-source more than we secure it.

Q5. Where can we learn more about software supply chain defense?

You can:

Follow CyberBivash for deep-dive incident posts like this.
Visit CyberDudeBivash.com for apps, services, and consulting.
Join the ThreatWire newsletter for ongoing, CISO-grade threat intel and defense blueprints.

If this post helped you understand the risk, share it with at least one engineering leader and one security lead in your organization. Open-source is not going away, but we can choose whether it becomes our greatest strength-or our weakest link.

Stay Tuned to CyberDudeBivash

#CyberDudeBivash #CyberBivash #npm #SupplyChainAttack #OpenSourceSecurity #DevSecOps #NodeJS #CI_CD #SoftwareSupplyChain #Malware #ThreatIntel #CyberSecurity #CISO #RansomwareDefense