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Category: APT / Cyber Espionage / Government • Published: December 18, 2025 • Author: Cyberdudebivash

How China’s “Ink Dragon” APT Hijacks Global Servers to Infiltrate European Government Networks

Executive takeaway: Ink Dragon is not winning by “loud zero-days.” It is winning by turning other people’s infrastructure into its infrastructure: misconfigured IIS/SharePoint servers become relay nodes, credential reuse becomes lateral movement, and the FINALDRAFT backdoor blends into Microsoft cloud-like traffic. The result is a stealthy espionage operation that is hard to attribute, hard to trace, and hard to eradicate once embedded.

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TL;DR (What matters now)

Who: “Ink Dragon” (China-linked cluster). Overlaps with names like Earth Alux, Jewelbug, REF7707, and CL-STA-0049.
What changed in 2025: Researchers observed expanded focus into European government networks while continuing targeting in Southeast Asia and South America.
Core technique: Compromise internet-facing servers and convert them into relay nodes (victim infrastructure becomes attacker infrastructure).
Initial access style: Emphasis on misconfigurations and low-noise access methods rather than noisy zero-days (as reported by researchers).
Signature tooling: FINALDRAFT backdoor (noted for stealth techniques like hiding C2 in email drafts and operating during business hours) and use of ShadowPad in campaigns.
What you do today: Lock down IIS/SharePoint exposure, audit misconfigurations, remove credential reuse, isolate management planes, and establish detection for unusual relay behavior on internet-facing systems.

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Table of Contents

1) Why this campaign matters for Europe and beyond

Edge infrastructure is the front gate of modern government networks. VPN concentrators, reverse proxies, SharePoint portals, IIS front-ends, and “temporary” internet-facing services become permanent over time. Ink Dragon’s current approach, as described by multiple reports, weaponizes that reality: compromise something on the edge, then use it as a quiet stepping stone into the real target environment. The most dangerous part is not the first compromise. It is what happens after the attacker establishes a stable relay and begins pivoting slowly.

Check Point Research described Ink Dragon expanding into European government targets while continuing activity in other regions and turning compromised servers into a relay network that supports future operations. This style of operations lowers attribution and raises dwell time because the attacker’s traffic appears to come from legitimate, previously compromised infrastructure.

2) Who is Ink Dragon (aliases, intent, targeting)

Ink Dragon is a China-linked espionage cluster described by Check Point Research and echoed across industry reporting. The same activity has been referenced under other tracking names, including Earth Alux, Jewelbug, REF7707, and CL-STA-0049. In tracking terms, this is normal: different vendors name the same cluster differently based on telemetry scope and analytic lineage.

The targeting described in recent reporting includes government entities and telecommunications across multiple regions, with increased emphasis on European government networks since mid-2025. The pattern is consistent with long-term collection: persistent access, stealth communications, relay operations, and measured lateral movement rather than smash-and-grab disruption.

3) How Ink Dragon hijacks global servers: the relay-network model

The defining operational advantage in this campaign is the “infrastructure hijack” concept: instead of always connecting directly to a victim from attacker-controlled C2 infrastructure, the operator repurposes compromised servers into relay nodes. Each relay becomes a disguise, a staging point, and a persistence anchor. When enough relays exist, the attacker has a distributed, resilient network that defenders struggle to block because the nodes are legitimate hosts inside legitimate organizations.

Check Point described custom IIS-based modules installed on internet-facing systems to transform compromised servers into relays. Multiple outlets also noted that initial access relied on probing for weaknesses and misconfigurations in Microsoft IIS and SharePoint environments, rather than loud exploitation. This tradecraft is optimized for stealth: low noise, credential reuse, and gradual spread where operational patterns are similar across environments.

Defender’s mental model: why relay networks are hard

Attribution blur: Traffic originates from “clean-looking” compromised servers, not attacker IP space.

Block pain: Blocking the relay may mean blocking legitimate government or telecom infrastructure.

Dwell time: Quiet, business-hour operations reduce anomaly signals and extend persistence.

Chain effect: One compromised relay can support multiple downstream intrusions.

4) Tradecraft and tooling: FINALDRAFT, ShadowPad, and stealth mechanics

In the reported tooling set, two names repeatedly appear: FINALDRAFT and ShadowPad. Reporting noted an updated FINALDRAFT variant designed to blend into typical Microsoft cloud-like activity. A notable stealth method described by researchers and repeated by several outlets is command-and-control being hidden in email drafts, with activity occurring during regular business hours to reduce detection probability in noisy enterprise environments.

ShadowPad is a known modular backdoor family frequently associated with sophisticated campaigns. In practical terms, when you see ShadowPad in an environment, you assume the operator expects to stay, not just visit. The combination of a stealthy backdoor and relay infrastructure forms a resilient operational base: even if one node is remediated, the attacker can route around it through other relays.

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5) Defender’s kill chain view (high-level)

Below is a simplified, defender-safe kill chain representation based on the published reporting. This is not a playbook for abuse. It is a framework for response planning.

Ink Dragon-style intrusion flow (high-level)

1) Target discovery — identify exposed IIS/SharePoint and management surfaces; look for weak configurations

2) Initial foothold — low-noise access path; avoid detections; leverage weak controls

3) Credential capture / reuse — harvest or reuse credentials to expand across systems with similar management patterns

4) Persistence — deploy backdoors; maintain stable long-term access

5) Relay conversion — install custom server-side components to turn internet-facing hosts into relay nodes

6) Lateral movement — move into internal networks to reach priority data and systems

7) Collection and exfiltration — steal sensitive data with stealthy channels; limit noise

6) Mandatory defenses: hardening, detection, and containment

If Ink Dragon’s competitive advantage is “quiet access + relays,” then your defensive advantage must be “hardening + identity discipline + edge telemetry.” The goal is not just to patch. The goal is to remove the conditions that make quiet campaigns profitable: misconfigurations, weak admin boundaries, and unmonitored internet-facing servers.

6.1 Mandatory hardening actions (IIS / SharePoint / Edge servers)

Inventory everything exposed: create a live list of internet-facing IIS and SharePoint hosts, including staging and legacy systems.
Eliminate risky defaults: remove unnecessary modules, close unused ports, and disable unused virtual directories.
Patch discipline: maintain a strict patch cadence for Windows Server, IIS components, SharePoint, .NET, and dependencies.
Restrict management planes: no management interfaces should be reachable publicly; require VPN + MFA + allowlists.
Credential hygiene: remove credential reuse across servers; rotate service accounts; use least privilege and separate admin tiers.
Segmentation: an edge server should not have broad east-west access into internal networks.

6.2 Detection priorities (what your SOC should watch)

Reports noted stealth behaviors like business-hours activity and hiding C2 in email drafts. You must respond by correlating across layers: IIS logs, Windows event logs, email telemetry, identity events, and network egress.

Edge anomalies: unusual authentication patterns, rare user agents, unexpected administrative actions on IIS/SharePoint servers.
Process and service integrity: unexpected server-side modules/components on IIS, changes in configuration, suspicious scheduled tasks or services.
Identity signals: new admin group membership, unusual logon times for privileged accounts, privilege escalation in short windows.
Email oddities: unusual draft activity, automation artifacts, or anomalous access patterns for service mailboxes (investigate with care and approvals).
Egress monitoring: servers initiating new outbound connections to rare domains or direct-to-IP destinations.

6.3 Containment principles (if compromise is suspected)

Isolate suspected edge hosts while preserving evidence (logs, memory capture where policy allows).
Assume credential exposure for any admin or service accounts used on compromised hosts; rotate systematically.
Rebuild from known-good images when integrity is uncertain. For sophisticated APT tradecraft, “cleaning” is often less reliable than rebuild.
Hunt for relays by searching for unusual server-side modules, proxy-like behavior, and unexplained inbound/outbound routing patterns.

CyberDudeBivash services that match this threat

Edge Infrastructure Hardening: IIS/SharePoint baselines, segmentation, admin boundary redesign
Compromise Assessment: rapid triage, evidence preservation guidance, IOC/behavioral hunting
Zero Trust Upgrade: identity tiering, MFA everywhere, least privilege, continuous access evaluation
Automation: patch verification automation, log correlation, alert normalization, SOAR playbooks

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7) Incident response checklist + 30-60-90 plan

Immediate IR checklist (first 24–72 hours)

Scope: Identify all internet-facing IIS/SharePoint servers and confirm which are mission-critical.
Preserve evidence: Export IIS logs, Windows event logs, and configuration snapshots. Forward copies off-host.
Contain: Restrict inbound access to edge hosts; remove management exposure from public internet.
Credential hygiene: Rotate privileged and service accounts used by edge servers. Enforce MFA for admin access.
Hunt: Search for relay-like behavior, unexpected server modules, persistence mechanisms, and anomalous outbound connections.
Recover: If integrity is uncertain, rebuild compromised servers from known-good images and re-enroll into management cleanly.

First 30 Days

Edge inventory + exposure reduction
Hardening baselines for IIS/SharePoint
Identity tiering and least privilege rollout

Next 60 Days

Centralized logging + correlation rules
Segmentation for edge-to-internal paths
SOAR playbooks for repeatable triage

By 90 Days

Continuous posture scanning for misconfigurations
Tabletop exercise: “edge server becomes relay”
Retest and red-team validation of hardening

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FAQ

Is Ink Dragon using zero-days?

Reporting emphasized low-noise access and misconfiguration probing rather than relying on loud zero-days. Operationally, that means hardening and identity hygiene are as important as patching.

Why are relays such a big problem?

Relays allow attacker traffic to originate from legitimate compromised servers. This complicates attribution, reduces detection, and creates a resilient infrastructure layer.

What should governments prioritize first?

Lock down management exposure, eliminate credential reuse, segment edge servers, and enforce centralized logging with rapid response playbooks for internet-facing systems.

How do we reduce risk quickly if we cannot rebuild everything?

Start with access control (VPN, allowlists, MFA), rotate secrets, restrict outbound traffic from edge servers, and hunt for relay/persistence indicators while scheduling rebuilds in priority order.

References

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